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("providers") serve over one hundred million subscribers with wireless
telephone and other services, generating almost fifty billion dollars in revenues
annually.' Wireless telephone service is called "cellular" because it operates
via a network of antennae, each of which serves a geographic cell. As the user
moves around, the cellular telephone is automatically linked to the nearest
antenna. 2 In order to supply service, providers must build antennae. When
cellular phones were introduced, the number of antennae was far from
adequate to provide complete coverage. Although service has improved
dramatically in recent years, partly due to advances in wireless technologyprimarily the shift from analog to digital service-improvement is largely
attributable to a major increase in the number of antennae, which allows for
3
much better coverage.
Although the number of antennae has increased dramatically, even in major
metropolitan areas there are still "dead" areas in which conversations become
distorted, crossed with other conversations, or even disconnected. Providers
continue to increase their coverage by building more antennae. These towers
are often unwelcome neighbors, especially in residential areas, and local
governments have used their traditional zoning powers 4 to regulate the
placement and appearance of cellular towers. Many zoning ordinances contain
height, area and use restrictions that affect antennae of all kinds, including
cellular towers. However, a major local concern has not been the appearance
and location of cellular towers but instead the potential damage to human
health from radiation emitted by cellular antennae.
Fearing that local zoning restrictions could inhibit the development of the
personal wireless communication service industry in the United States,
Congress included provisions in the 1996 Telecommunications Act ("TCA")
that limit local zoning authorities' powers to regulate cellular towers. Section
704 of the TCA, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (Supp. IV 1998)
[hereinafter "§ 332(c)(7)"], expressly preserves the power of local zoning
See Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n, Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey
Results: June 1985

to

June 2000 (visited

Aug.

21,

2001)

<http://www.wow-

com.com/pdf/wireless-survey-2000.pdf> (on file with the Boston University Law Review
[hereinafter Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n, Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey

Results]. The website's front page reports subscribers at more than 120,000,000. See
Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n, World of Wireless Communications (visited Aug. 21,
2001) <http://www.wow-com.com> (on file with the Boston University Law Review
[hereinafter Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n, World of Wireless Communications].
2 See Fed. Communications Comm'n, Wireless FacilitiesSiting Issues: Fact Sheet #1:

New

National Wireless

Tower Siting Policies (last

modified

April

23,

1996)

<http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/siting/factl.pdf> (explaining how a cellular system operates).
I Between 1996 and 2000, the number of cellular antenna sites almost quadrupled from
approximately 25,000 in 1996 to more than 95,000 in 2000. See Cellular Telecomms. &
Internet. Ass'n, Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey Results, supra note 1.
'

New York City enacted the first comprehensive zoning program in 1916. See generally

JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 992 (3d ed. 1993).
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authorities over the siting of cellular phone towers. 5 However, this section
goes on to limit that local authority in several ways. First, it prohibits
"unreasonabl[e] discriminat[ion] among providers of functionally equivalent
services" and forbids state and local authorities from imposing zoning
restrictions that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of
personal wireless services."'6 Second, it prohibits state and local governments
from regulating cellular towers "on the basis of the environmental effects of
radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the
[Federal Communications] Commission's [("FCC" ) ] regulations concerning
such emissions."'7 This provision effectively preempts local law that regulates
the siting of cellular antennae based on health or other environmental effects of
the emission of radio waves. The TCA also imposes procedural requirements
on local governments, including timely decisions on applications to construct
cellular antennae and a requirement that any denial of permission to construct
an antenna "be '8in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a
written record."
The TCA also grants providers two options to enforce its requirements
against state and local zoning authorities. First, providers aggrieved by any
state or local action regarding cellular towers are granted an action in "any
court of competent jurisdiction" to be heard on an "expedited basis." 9 The
section does not specify the remedies available, but presumably a court would
have the power to overturn a state or local government's denial of permission
to site or modify a cellular tower. Second, in any case in which it is alleged
that a permit to site or modify a cellular tower was denied because of
environmental or health concerns, the aggrieved personal wireless service
provider may petition the FCC for relief.' 0 Again, although the statute does
not mention remedies, presumably the FCC, if it found a denial improper,
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
6 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i). A zoning restriction could "have the effect of prohibiting

the provision of personal wireless services" by disallowing placement of antennae adequate
to cover an area as, for example, by completely prohibiting antennae in a municipalitywhere antennae in a neighboring municipality could not cover the entire area of the
prohibiting municipality- or by restricting them to sites that are inadequate to provide
coverage to all subscribers in the area.
7 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
8 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
9 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
10 The relevant code, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v), states:
Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act by a State or local
government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph
may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court
of competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited
basis. Any person adversely affected by an act or failure to act by a State or local
government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with clause (iv) may
petition the Commission for relief.
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would order the state or local government to grant the permit.
This provision is, to put it mildly, a model of poor statutory drafting. It
raises more questions than it answers. Most obviously, it completely omits
reference to remedies, leaving it a mystery as to what courts or the FCC must
do if they conclude that the TCA has been violated. More fundamentally, its
substantive provisions are so vague as to provide little in the way of guidance
to courts that attempt to discern whether a violation has occurred. For
example, what is "unreasonabl[e] discriminat[ion]" among providers of
cellular services? Could a local zoning body allow some providers to construct
antennae and then reject all further applications on the ground that more
antennae would be unacceptable aesthetically, or would that amount to
unreasonable discrimination in favor of incumbents? When would a refusal
amount to an effective prohibition of the provision of personal communication
services? Is local government obligated, by these provisions, to allow every
provider sufficient access to cover completely every municipality, or is it
enough that there exists some competition within the locality? Finally, if a
zoning body rejects an application to build an antenna and cites only aesthetic
or related concerns in its decision, could a court find that the rejection was
based on environmental factors if local residents argued against approval based
on such concerns? In short, § 332(c)(7) leaves numerous important issues for
judicial resolution with little statutory guidance.
Personal wireless service providers whose applications for permission to
construct antennae have been denied by local government zoning authorities
have brought actions in state and federal court to force local governments to
grant the permits. In some of these cases, not only have victorious providers
convinced courts to order local governments to approve their applications, they
have, despite the American rule that parties are usually responsible for their
own attorney's fees, persuaded courts to award attorney's fees in their favor
against local governments. They have done so by bringing their claims to
enforce the TCA under section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which, inter alia, grants a cause of action against persons, who, acting
under color of state law, deny federal statutory rights."I By bringing what is
known as an "and laws" claim under § 1983 to enforce the TCA, providers are
able to take advantage of section 722 of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act
of 1976, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which grants attorney's fees to
prevailing parties in cases brought under § 1983 and other civil rights

statutes. J2
In this article, we argue that enforcing the TCA against state and local
zoning authorities raises serious legal concerns, especially if such enforcement
is via a § 1983 "and laws" action. In particular, we argue that courts should not
award attorney's fees under § 1988 to providers who prevail in claims alleging
violation of TCA section 704. First, we argue that this is not an appropriate
II See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1998).
12See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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"and laws" claim because the TCA's cell siting provisions, in the main, do not
create rights that are enforceable via § 1983 action. Further, in our view
Congress did not intend that providers be free to use an "and laws" claim to
enforce their rights under the TCA and receive an award of attorney's fees.
Second, even if an "and laws" claim is available, we argue that courts should
use their discretion not to award attorney's fees because (1) the civil rightsrelated purposes of the attorney's fees statute, as an exception to the American
rule, are not met, and (2) the awarding of attorney's fees would threaten to
undermine local government control of the important area of zoning. Third,
we discuss the constitutionality of both the TCA's cell siting provisions and
the "and laws" clause of § 1983. We first argue that some provisions of §
332(c)(7) may be unconstitutional because they impose specific duties on
local government in violation of the anti-commandeering principle applied in
recent Supreme Court Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Next, we raise the
possibility that the "and laws" clause of § 1983 is unconstitutional under recent
understandings of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,
at least when the clause is used to enforce laws passed under powers not
related to civil rights, such as the commerce power under which the TCA was
passed.
This article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we review the personal wireless
communication service industry, focusing primarily on the provisions of the
TCA relating to local zoning authority. In Part H, we explain and criticize the
doctrinal basis under which providers have been awarded attorney's fees
through the "and laws" clause of § 1983. In this Part we argue that the "and
laws" clause should not apply to actions to enforce the TCA because providers
should be confined to enforcement under the TCA itself, and that even if the
"and laws" clause does apply, courts should use their discretion to deny
attorney's fees awards in cases enforcing the TCA. In Part III, we examine the
obligations the TCA places on state and local government officials and
conclude that, at least in part, the TCA violates the Tenth Amendment anticommandeering principles recognized recently by the Supreme Court. We also
argue in this Part that the "and laws" clause may be unconstitutional by
exceeding Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Part IV
summarizes our conclusions.
I. BACKGROUND

A. PersonalWireless Services
Personal wireless services, like most elements of the telecommunications
industry and most uses of the broadcast spectrum, are subject to extensive
federal regulation. The FCC allocates the broadcast spectrum among different
uses and among competitors providing the same services. Cellular telephone
technology maximizes use of the limited available spectrum by dividing
service areas into small regions called "cells." Providers employ "frequency
reuse," assigning the same frequencies to multiple non-adjacent cells in order
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to prevent cells from interfering with each other. Wireless subscribers moving
from one cell to another are imperceptibly transferred, or "handed-off,"
receiving uninterrupted service. 13 However, each cell has a finite capacity
based upon its available bandwidth and the number of users within its range.
Wireless services are extremely popular with consumers in the United
States. There are currently over one hundred million wireless subscribers in
the United States.' 4 This popularity drives increasingly rapid industry growth.
As wireless service usage increases, so must the infrastructure that supports it.
The most visible element of the wireless infrastructure is the network of
antennae that compose a cellular system. To expand service into new
geographic areas, a provider must erect new antennae , creating new cells.
Further, to accommodate more users, providers must create more cells within
the same geographic region. As more cells are created, more towers must go
up. Since 1996, the number of cell sites-antenna locations-has almost
quadrupled, approaching one hundred thousand; annual industry revenue has
grown more than one hundred percent, approaching fifty billion dollars; and
cumulative capital investment has more than tripled, exceeding seventy-five
5
billion dollars.'
In many areas, state and local zoning laws regulate the types of structures
that may be built in a particular area as well as the size and aesthetics of those
structures that are built. In order to provide adequate coverage, cellular phone
16
providers must locate antennas closer and closer to residential property.
Many of these locations are not zoned to allow transmission facilities, and
wireless providers have often been unwelcome guests. 7 However, if providers
" See Federal Communications Comm'n, supra note 2 ("As a subscriber travels across
the service area the call is transferred (handed-off) from one cell to another without
noticeable interruption.").
14 See Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n, World of Wireless Communication, supra
note 1.
15 See Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n, Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey
Results, supra note I (as of June 2000).
6 See Dean J. Donatelli, Note, Locating Cellular Telephone Facilities: How Should
Communities Answer When Cellular Telephone Companies Call?, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 447,
453-54 (1996) (explaining that the ideal configuration for antennae within cells and the
growing number of cellular telephone users has led providers to select sites where zoning
ordinances forbid such a use or where residents oppose the installation); see also, e.g.,
Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (D. Conn.
1998) (explaining that provider Cellco applied to the Zoning Commission to rebuild a
church steeple and place cellular antennae inside); Julie Tamaki, Disguises Help Cut Static
Over High-Tech Towers, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1998, at BI (noting a current trend toward
disguising cellular antennae as trees and church steeples to reduce "visual blight").
17 See Hearings on H.R. 1555 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. and Finance of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995), availablein 1995 WL 295409 (F.D.C.H.)
(statement of Wayne Perry, Vice Chairman of McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. and
AT&T Wireless Services) (describing the increasing number of overlapping local
regulations on cellular tower emissions and siting).
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are not allowed to build their antennae, cells without transmission facilities can
result, creating dead zones, or "holes," in a provider's service area. Consumers
passing through such a hole cannot place calls, and calls placed elsewhere are
suddenly disconnected when the consumer enters that dead zone.
B. The 1996 Telecommunications Act

Congress recognized that wireless services would be unpopular, or possibly
economically unfeasible, unless they were uniform and reliable.' 8 In order to
secure that uniformity and reliability, § 332(c)(7) regulates local zoning
authority over the placement of transmission facilities.' 9 Specifically, although
most local zoning authority is explicitly preserved in the TCA, the TCA
restricts local zoning authorities in several ways. Local authorities may not
impose regulations that "discriminate among providers of functionally
equivalent services," 20 or "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services."'2' In addition, local authorities may
not regulate "on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency
22
emissions" as long as FCC requirements are met.
The Act also imposes three procedural requirements on local decisionmaking concerning the placement of towers. The local authority must address
personal wireless service facility permit applications within a reasonable
period of time;23 it may deny applications only in writing and with a statement
of reasons; and any denial must be "supported by substantial evidence
contained in a written record.

' 24

The TCA also provides two avenues of relief for applicants whose
applications regarding wireless communication service transmission facilities
have been denied by zoning authorities. The TCA allows any person adversely
affected by any final state or local zoning decision regarding transmission
'25
facilities to "commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.
The TCA requires courts to hear and decide such actions on an expedited
basis. 26 Finally, the Act provides that a person adversely affected by a state or
local action regarding the placement of wireless transmission facilities based
8 See

Leonard J. Kennedy & Heather A. Purcell, Section 332 of the CommunicationsAct

of 1934: A Federal Regulatory Framework That Is "Hog Tight, Horse High, and Bull
Strong", 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 547, 548-50, 559-62 (1998) (explaining congressional
recognition in enacting section 704 of the TCA that state and local regulation of wireless
service providers was impeding the development of a national wireless service industry).
"9 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (Supp. IV 1998).
20 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I).
2' 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
22 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
23 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
24 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
25 47 U.S.C, § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).

26 See id. ("The court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited basis.").
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27
on environmental effects may petition the FCC for relief.
Although courts with jurisdiction are directed to hear and decide cases
arising under the TCA on an expedited basis, the TCA is silent on remedies,
with no mention of whether damages or injunctive relief are preferred or
whether any party should recover attorney's fees or costs. Congress apparently
either overlooked the remedies question, left it to the courts to fashion
appropriate remedies, or thought it was obvious that the appropriate remedy for
violating this provision of the TCA would be an order requiring the zoning
authorities to issue the relevant permit. The TCA's "substantial evidence"
requirement, which is a common standard used in judicial review of agency
action, does not really help resolve the remedial issue because courts employ a
wide range of remedies in judicial review of agency action, including
reversing agency action, remanding a matter to the agency for further
consideration, and, in some cases, ordering an agency to issue a permit or
license wrongfully withheld.

II. SUITS TO ENFORCE THE TCA

Despite the TCA's lack of provisions concerning remedies, injunctive relief
forcing state and local officials to abide by the TCA is presumably available.
Injunctions could run the gamut from orders to issue written decisions, to
decide on permits within a reasonable time, or to issue permits. 2 8 It is unclear
whether courts would award damages resulting from violations of the TCA,
although one can imagine situations in which damages would be appropriate,
for example, if a provider lost profits because of an illegal denial of a permit,
or if a locality imposed expensive conditions on a provider that later proved to

27 See id. ("Any person adversely affected by an act or failure to act by a state or local

government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with clause (iv) [the
environmental effects provision] may petition the Commission for relief.").
28 Interestingly, in AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1352,
1353 (N.D. Ga. 1999), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 00-15885, 2001 WL 1049229
(1 th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001), the district court appears to have thought that the issuance of a
permit follows automatically upon a finding of a procedural violation. An Eleventh Circuit
panel initially reversed the district court's decision, but the panel's decision was vacated and
then the appeal was dismissed after en banc rehearing was granted. See AT&T Wireless
PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 210 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (vacating the district court's
decision), vacated for lack of jurisdiction,223 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir. 2000), reinstated,250
F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, No. 00-15885, 2001 WL
901250 (11 th Cir. Aug. 10, 2001), and appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 00-15885,
2001 WL 1049229 (11 th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001). It is not clear why the district court, see 50 F.
Supp. 2d 1352 (N.D. Ga. 1999), did not consider whether it was appropriate to first allow
the city to attempt to comply by issuing a written decision based on a written record.
Compare City of Richmond v. Randall, 211 S.E.2d 56, 61 (Va. 1975) (hesitating to order
issuance of a special use permit, because under Virginia law only a legislative body could
issue permits, not courts on judicial review).
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be illegal. 29 One way that providers have achieved certainty concerning
remedies is to bring suit under section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which clearly allows damages and injunctive relief and, when
coupled with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, attorney's
fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 30 The following discussion explains how a
violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 can be transformed into an
action under § 1983.
A. Section 1983 Actions to Enforce the TCA
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for citizens whose federal
rights, both constitutional and statutory, have been violated by a state actor
under color of state law. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
31
other proper proceeding for redress ....
Section 1983 creates no rights. Rather, it provides a remedy for rights
established elsewhere in federal law. 32 The section derives substantially from
the first part of the Act of April 20, 1871, sometimes referred to as the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 or the Ku Klux Klan Act. 33 The primary purpose of § 1983
is to provide a remedy in federal court in favor of private parties when state or
local officials violate their federal rights. As the Supreme Court has stated,
the purpose of § 1983 is to "interpose the federal courts between the States and
the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people
from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be

executive, legislative, or judicial., '

34

29 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[Flederal courts may use any available

remedy to make good the wrong done."); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248
(1979) ("By virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a damages remedy is ...available to redress
injuries .. when they occur under color of state law.").
'0See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
3142 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
32 See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979) ("[O]ne
cannot go into court and claim a 'violation of § 1983'-for § 1983 by itself does not protect
anyone against anything.").
33See 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (1871); Dist. of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973)
(noting that § 1983 is rooted in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, whose primary purpose was
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
31 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346 (1880)).
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal
right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
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1. "And Laws"
When Congress codified the federal statutes in the Revised Statutes in
1874, the phrase "and laws" was added to § 1983, extending the remedy
provided by § 1983 to violations of federal statutes by state and local officials
acting under color of law. 35 Although there is reason to believe that Congress
did not mean to extend § 1983's protections beyond the civil rights setting, the
Supreme Court has held that the "and laws" clause should be taken literally to
mean that violations of any federal statute under color of state law can
presumptively give rise to a § 1983 action. 36 Providers of cellular service can
thus make out a claim under the "and laws" clause of § 1983 by alleging that
state and local officials, by denying a permit to construct or modify a facility,
have deprived them of their rights under the TCA.
It is only a short step from finding that a § 1983 action is available to redress
violations of the TCA to awarding attorney's fees to providers who have
brought successful § 1983 challenges to state and local zoning decisions. The
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides that district courts
may, in their discretion, award attorney's fees to prevailing parties in, inter
alia, § 1983 actions. 37 The Supreme Court has held that prevailing plaintiffs,
provided they achieve a significant remedy such as an injunction or more than
nominal damages, are nearly always entitled to attorney's fees 38 and that this
39
entitlement extends to "and laws" claims.

There are reasons, however, to question not only whether a § 1983 action
ought to be available to enforce the TCA, but also, even if such an action is
available, whether courts should award attorney's fees to prevailing providers
in such cases. We address each of these issues in turn.

otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment
of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might
be denied by the state agencies.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961).
" See Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1878) (adding the "and laws" clause); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1,4 (1980).
36 See id. The argument that the "and laws" clause was meant to encompass only
violations of civil rights laws is based on two factors. First, Congress stated that it did not
intend to make substantive changes in the recodification process. Second, § 1983's
jurisdictional counterpart was amended in the recodification process to provide jurisdiction
for cases involving "an Act of Congress providing for equal rights." The Court in Thiboutot
rejected both these arguments. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 6-8; infra notes 313-317 and
accompanying text.
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
38 See Hensley v. Eckerhardt, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (citing Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581
F.2d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1978)). "[P]laintiffs may be considered 'prevailing parties' for
attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefits the parties sought in bringing suit." Id. (quoting Nadeau at 278-79).
" See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5.
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2. Exceptions to the Availability of the "And Laws" Action
Shortly after the Court decided that the "and laws" clause should be read
literally to apply to all federal laws, not merely to federal civil rights or equal
rights laws, the Court, in the Pennhurst case, 40 created two exceptions to this
general rule. First, the Court noted that the § 1983 remedy would not be
available if the federal statute upon which the plaintiff relies for the "and laws"
claim does not create rights with sufficient clarity to be enforceable legally.4'
Second, the Court observed that a § 1983 "and laws" action would not42be
available when the federal statute in question provides an exclusive remedy.
a. No Enforceable Rights
The Pennhurst case illustrates the "no enforceable rights" exception to the
availability of § 1983 "and laws" claims.. Pennhurst was a class action
alleging that Pennhurst State School violated federal rights conferred by, inter
alia, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
("Act").43 The Court-in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist-eventually
reversed and remanded the case because it found that Congress did not intend
to create enforceable rights in the Act. 44 Rather, the Act merely "express[ed] a
congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment. '45 The Act's "Bill of
Rights" 46 provision, "simply a general statement of findings," was "too thin a
reed" on which to support an argument that it creates "enforceable rights and
obligations.

47

The Court has set forth three criteria for determining whether a federal
statute creates rights that are enforceable in a § 1983 "and laws" action. The
criteria are: (1) that "Congress ha[s] intended the provision in question to
benefit the plaintiff," (2) that the "right ... is not so 'vague and amorphous'
that its enforcement would strain judicial competence," and (3) that 48"the
If
statute ... unambiguously impose[s] a binding obligation on the States.
that
rights
creates
these criteria are met, then the federal statute in question
may give rise to a § 1983 "and laws" claim.
40

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)

[hereinafter

Pennhurst].
41

Id. at 28.

42 See id. at 28.

43 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994) (Congress has repealed Chapter 75 of Title 42,
containing §§ 6000-6083. The Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
of 2000 is codified at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 15001-15115 (2001); see Pennhurst,451 U.S. at I.
44 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18 (arguing that the Act's "language and structure
demonstrate that it is a mere federal-state funding statute").
45 Id.

46 See 42 U.S.C. § 6009.
17 Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 18.
48 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (quoting Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430-32 (1987)).
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Illustrative of the application of these criteria is the Court's analysis, in
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 49 of whether the Medicaid Act creates

enforceable rights. Medicaid is a joint program between the states and the
federal government. 50 In order to receive federal funds, a state must maintain
a medical assistance plan that provides reasonable and adequate compensation
52
to health care providers. 5' The Virginia Hospital Association sued Virginia
under § 1983 for failing to comply with these federal requirements, specifically
53
alleging that Virginia's compensation was neither reasonable nor adequate.
Virginia asserted that the Medicaid Act did not create rights, privileges, or
immunities within the context of § 1983.
The Court held that the Medicaid Act's "reasonable and adequate"
compensation requirement created a right enforceable by health care providers.
The Court noted that this provision was clearly intended to benefit health care
providers and to expressly bind the states.54 Despite this provision's
generality, the courts were held competent to enforce it. 55 What is most
significant about the Court's decision is that it found an enforceable right in a
relatively imprecise provision that appears more like an administrative
standard than a liability standard.
b. Comprehensive Remedial Scheme

The Court addressed the second exception to the availability of the "and
laws" action, the comprehensive remedial scheme, shortly after Pennhurst. In
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 56 the

Court held that because the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 57 ("FWPCA")
had its own "sufficiently comprehensive" remedial scheme, Congress must
have intended to preclude § 1983 claims against state and local officials for
violating the FWPCA.5 8 The general rule under which the Court denied the §
1983 claim for FWPCA violations is that when Congress passes a statute that
has its own comprehensive remedial scheme with carefully drawn substantive
and procedural provisions, it must have intended for that comprehensive
scheme to govern claims under that statute. A § 1983 claim, free of the
49 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
50

See id. at 502.

"' See id. at 502-03.
52 L. Douglas Wilder, the named defendant, was then Governor of Virginia.
51 See Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. at 503-04.
54 At one time, receipt of federal Medicaid funds was expressly conditioned on state
waiver of sovereign immunity. See id. at 516-17.
" The Court stated that although both the states and the Secretary of Health and Human

Services enjoyed ample discretion to measure their rates, and judges might require "some
knowledge of the hospital industry," to evaluate those measurements, "such an inquiry is
well within the competence of the Judiciary." Id. at 520.
56 453 U.S. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Sea Clammers].
57 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 and Supp. IV 1998).
51 See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 21.
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particulars of the comprehensive scheme, would upset the balance Congress
struck in the particular statute.
A more detailed look at the Sea Clammers case illustrates the workings of
the rule.. The National Sea Clammers Association sued several defendants for
illegal sewerage discharge under the FWPCA, the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 ("MPRSA"), 59 the federal common law
of negligence, and a variety of other legal theories. 60 The defendants sought to
have the suits dismissed because the plaintiffs had failed to comply with all the
procedural requirements of the citizen-suit provisions of the FWPCA and
MPRSA. 61 The plaintiffs persisted, based upon "saving clauses" 62 in both
statutes, which, they argued, allowed an implied private right of action
regardless of their compliance with the citizen-suit provisions. 63 The Court
rejected this argument based on the structure and legislative history of the
FWPCA and MPRSA. 64
The Court sua sponte, and not the plaintiffs, raised the possibility of a §
1983 suit to enforce the provisions of the FWPCA and the MPRSA. Even in
an age of judicial activism, it was somewhat surprising to see the Court
advance and reject a cause of action not relied upon by any plaintiff in the
case. 65 Nonetheless, the Sea Clammers Court raised a § 1983 "and laws" claim
as "a possible alternative source of express congressional authorization of
private suits under these Acts." ' 66 "[I]f controlling, [the § 1983] argument
would obviate the need to consider whether Congress intended to authorize
private suits to enforce these particularly federal statutes. '67 The Court
concluded that the FWPCA's and the MPRSA's citizen-suit provisions were
"sufficiently comprehensive" to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude §

'9See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1994 and Supp.IV 1998).
60See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 5.

61See id. at 10-11. Suits under these statutes must be preceded by sixty days' notice "(i)
to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any
alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order .... 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(A) (1994).
62

Like the FWPCA, the MPRSA contains a "savings clause," which states: "The
injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State agency)."
Sea Claminers, 453 U.S. at 8 n.I I (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5)).
63 See id. at 9-10.
6 See id. at 18.
65 The plaintiffs did not raise a § 1983 "and laws" claim because Thiboutot was decided
after the suit was initiated. See id. at 19; see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)
(extending the remedy provided by § 1983 to violations of federal statutes by state and local
officials acting under color of law).
66 See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 19.
67

Id.
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1983 enforcement. 68 The Court found it "hard to believe that Congress
intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many
69
specific statutory remedies, including the two citizen-suit provisions.
This conclusion regarding congressional intent is somewhat hard to
swallow, given that both statutes contained savings clauses, one of which, for
example, provided that its provisions "shall not restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief.'70 Thus,
when the underlying federal statute-which provides the right that a § 1983
"and laws" claim would vindicate--contains its own comprehensive internal
remedial mechanism, the § 1983 action is precluded, apparently even in the
face of a savings clause indicating congressional intent to preserve alternate
remedies.
c. The Two Exceptions in Tandem

The Supreme Court has continued to work out the contours of the two
exceptions to the availability of the § 1983 "and laws" action. The "no
enforceable rights" branch has generated less case law than the
"comprehensive remedial scheme" branch, but both continue to be important
limitations on the availability of the § 1983 "and laws" action. The Court's
most recent "and laws" case involved both exceptions. Blessing v. Freestone71
involved whether § 1983 was available to private individuals to compel state
compliance with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act ("Title IV-D"). 72 Title
IV-D sets out the compliance requirements for states participating in the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program ("AFDC"). 73

As part of the

federal funding of state AFDC programs, states are required to achieve
substantial compliance with federal standards regarding collection and
distribution of child support payments, including helping custodial parents to
locate absent parents and to establish paternity of children born out of
wedlock. 74 Congress established the Office of Child Support Enforcement
within the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to administer
the program, and if a state fails to achieve "substantial compliance" with
federal guidelines, the Secretary of HHS can penalize the state by withholding
75
up to five percent of federal AFDC funds.
68 Id. at 20.
69

Id.

70 Id. at 8 n.I I (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5)) (emphasis added).
7 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
72

42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b (1994 & Supp. 1998).

" See id.; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 333.
74 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 609(a)(8), 651, 654 (1994 & Supp. 1998); Blessing, 520 U.S. at 335.
75 See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(8) (Supp. IV 1998); Blessing, 520 U.S. at 335; see also 45
C.F.R. § 305.63 (2000) (superseding 45 C.F.R. § 305.20 and interpreting "substantial
compliance" to be full compliance with administrative details, ninety percent compliance
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In a case involving a suit brought by four Arizona mothers seeking relief
over Arizona's failure to meet federal standards, the Court found that Title IVD's "substantial compliance" requirement did not create an enforceable right
because it "was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial
parents .... ,,76 Rather, the "substantial compliance" standard was designed to
77
aid federal officials in determining whether to penalize non-complying states.
The Court did assume, however, that Title IV-D's more specific requirements
might create other rights that could be enforced via § 1983.78
The Court also held that Title IV-D's administrative scheme, under which
HHS could withhold funds should a state fail to meet federal standards, did not
constitute a comprehensive remedial scheme that would indicate congressional
intent to disallow a § 1983 "and laws" action. 79 The Court noted that it had
held only twice that a statute's own remedial scheme was "sufficiently
comprehensive to supplant § 1983"80 and that in both cases, the federal statute
at issue contained its own private remedy. 8' With regard to statutes that
contain no private remedy but only an administrative enforcement scheme, the
Court has always rejected the "comprehensive remedial scheme" defense on
the ground that the lack of a private remedy indicates that Congress did not
82
intend to foreclose the § 1983 remedy.
Another factor that the Court has emphasized, when deciding that the §
1983 "and laws" remedy should not be available, is the level of procedural
detail contained in the "and laws" statute. 83 The Court apparently presumes,
consistent with common sense, that if Congress carefully constructs a remedial
scheme in a federal statute, with finely tuned substantive and procedural
with guidelines for opening and closing cases, and seventy-five percent compliance with all
other guidelines).
76 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 345 ("We do not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D
give rise to individual rights. The lower court did not separate out the particular rights it
believed arise from the statutory scheme, and we think the complaint is less than clear in
this regard."). The Court concluded that a remand was necessary to determine "exactly
what rights, considered in their most concrete, specific form, respondents are asserting.
Only by manageably breaking down the complaint into specific allegations can the District
Court proceed to determine whether any specific claim asserts an individual federal right."
Id. at 346.
71 See id. at 348 (stating that the Secretary's oversight powers are not broad enough to
preclude § 1983 liability).
Id. at 347.
81 See id. at 347-48 (discussing Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) and Smith v. Robinson,
50

468 U.S. 992, 992 (1984)).
82 See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987);
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) [hereinafter
Golden State].
83 See Golden State, 493 U.S. at 107 n.4; Wright, 479 U.S. at 423; Sea Clammers, 453
U.S. at 17.
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requirements, then Congress would not have intended to allow plaintiffs to
avoid those requirements by bringing their claims under § 1983. The more
finely tuned the procedural structure, the stronger the presumption that the
84
particular statutory scheme supplants the § 1983 claim.
In fact, a finely tuned private remedial scheme can supplant not only "and
laws" § 1983 claims but also constitutional ones as well, striking at the core of
§ 1983. There are two examples of this: (1) constitutional claims for release
from state prison, which the Court has held are supplanted by the habeas
corpus statute,85 and (2) constitutional claims alleging equal protection
violations by local schools regarding education for handicapped children,
which the Court has held are supplanted by the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act ("EAHCA"). 86 These statutes share two important features: (1)
they provide private remedies in a narrowly defined area of potential
constitutional claims, and (2) they contain detailed procedures, including
exhaustion requirements, that would not apply in cases brought under § 1983. 87
84 This analysis is a bit conjectural because the Court has not looked at a statute with a
private remedy that did not contain detailed procedural requirements. See, e.g., Golden
State, 493 U.S. at 106. The TCA is such a statute because, although it has a private remedy,
it has very little procedural detail.
85 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) (providing that writs of habeas corpus are available, inter
alia, to a person who is in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States or its
laws or treaties); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994) ("An applicant shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the Courts of the State... if he has the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."); see Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
86 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (codifying the EAHCA. The
EAHCA of 1975, see Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, became the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") by amendment in 1991. See Pub. L. No. 102-119, 105
Stat 587. In 1997, the IDEA underwent further change. See Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat
37.); see Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984) ("Congress intended handicapped
children with constitutional claims to a free appropriate public education to pursue those
claims through the carefully tailored administrative and judicial mechanism set out in the
[EAHCA]."). Some lower courts have held that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for
employment discrimination by state and local employers, supplanting the § 1983 remedy for
employment-related equal protection violations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998); see, e.g., Jackson v. City of Atlanta, 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1996)
("[Section] 1983 is not available when 'the governing statute provides an exclusive remedy
for violations of its terms."' (citations omitted)); but see, Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community
Sch., 766 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding that Title VII and the Fourteenth
Amendment bestowed individual rights, the former covered under its own remedial scheme,
and the latter addressable under a § 1983 claim).
87 These statutes are different in one respect that apparently is not important to the Court:
The habeas statute, like § 1983, provides a remedy for constitutional violations but contains
no substantive standards of its own. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (providing that writ of habeas
corpus is available to a person in custody in violation of, inter alia, the Constitution of the
United States). The IDEA , by contrast, not only provides a remedy but contains its own
substantive standards that are not necessarily identical to the constraints that the equal
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Although the analysis is similar to that applied to determine whether Congress
intends to allow an "and laws" claim, it is important to note that these are not
"and laws" claims. Rather, they are situations in which the Court believes that
Congress intended to repeal § 1983's coverage of constitutional claims when it
passed a detailed statute in a particular area of potential constitutional
violations.
Despite the logical appeal of the Court's analysis, it may be that the Court
gets Congress's intent exactly wrong when it allows the "and laws" action
whenever the remedial scheme lacks a private remedy. When a federal statute
contains an administrative enforcement mechanism but no private remedy, it
88
may be more likely that Congress preferred to have no private remedy.
Conversely, when the statute contains its own private remedy, it may be less
disruptive of Congress's scheme to add the § 1983 remedy to those provided in
the "and laws" statute itself. However, absent a change of heart at the Court,
the lack of a private remedy in an "and laws" statute is taken as evidence of
congressional intent to preserve the § 1983 remedy.
3. Exceptions Applied to the TCA
a. Does the TCA Create Enforceable Rights?

Our next step is to apply this framework to the wireless telecommunications
facilities siting provisions of the TCA. There is little doubt that the TCA
creates at least some enforceable rights. The TCA states in no uncertain terms
that state and local zoning authorities must follow its rather specific procedural
elements. The requirement that decisions on permit applications be in writing
and supported by substantial evidence on a written record, are very specific
and appear to be intended to benefit applicants for permits to construct wireless
service facilities.89 They are identical to procedural requirements traditionally
placed on agencies and enforced on judicial review. 90 The TCA repeatedly
refers to "State or local" governments, thus explicitly placing obligations on

protection clause might place on educational decisions regarding handicapped children. See
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 Title VII is akin to the education statute in that it contains
substantive standards as well as procedural limitations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20Oe-

17.
88 This was Justice Powell's point in his influential dissent in Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), which ultimately convinced the Court not to infer private
rights of action from federal statutes without strong evidence that Congress intended the
right of action to exist. See Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533
(1989) (holding that intent is the standard).
" See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (Supp. IV 1998).
90 Because substantial evidence is a traditional standard of review that courts apply to
agencies, insofar as this provision indicates that courts hearing claims arising under the cell
siting provisions of the TCA should apply the "substantial evidence" standard of review,
there is no indefiniteness problem with this aspect of the TCA's cell siting provisions.
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states. 9' These procedural provisions are definite enough to create legal
obligations.
The other procedural provisions, that zoning authorities act on applications
within a "reasonable period of time" 92 and that actions to enforce the TCA be
heard "on an expedited basis," 93 may not be sufficiently clear to create rights
enforceable in § 1983 "and laws" actions. What is a "reasonable period of
time" for acting on an application to construct or modify a wireless
transmission facility? Further, what does it mean for a court to hear an action
on an "expedited basis"? Does it mean that it must be heard before all other
cases, or only that it must jump the queue over some cases but not all?These
two provisions- the requirement that zoning bodies act on applications within
a "reasonable period of time" and the requirement that courts hear these
actions on an expedited basis-are as indefinite as the "substantial
compliance" standard that the Supreme Court found insufficiently clear to
create enforceable rights. 94 One might perceive them as aspirational rather
than enforceable.
Except for the prohibition against consideration of the effects of radio
frequency emissions, which seems pretty clear, the remaining substantive
provisions of the TCA raise even more doubt about whether they are definite
enough to create enforceable rights. The prohibitions against "unreasonabl[e]
discriminat[ion]" 95 and against action "having the effect of prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services" 96 leave a great deal of uncertainty. For
example, may a town deny a permit to build a cell tower on the ground that
there are too many such towers in the town already and that yet another would
cause visual clutter? This is a very common consideration in zoning matters
and would not be an equal protection violation under constitutional standards.
However, at least one court has found that denying a permit for this reason
violates the TCA, holding that such a zoning decision discriminated in favor
97
of existing providers.
9' See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).

13

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).

14

See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 344- (1997) (holding that the substantial

92

compliance standard "does not give rise to individual rights").
91 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I).
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
9' See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council , 979 F. Supp. 416, 416 (E.D. Va.
1997), rev'd, 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998). Such a holding has enormously destructive
potential for local zoning authority. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended to
require every municipality to allow a cell site for every cellular provider who applies. A
small town could end up with dozens of towers cluttering the landscape. Other courts have
96

allowed local zoning authorities much more leeway, allowing denials, for example, based
upon the "visual impact" of the tower or evidence of substantial opposition among residents.
See Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 60-61 (1st Cir. 2001)
(approving application of local zoning bylaw's "minimal visual impact" criterion to deny
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The other substantive provision is even more confusing. What does it mean
for a local government action to "have the effect of prohibiting the provision of
personal wireless services"? If some providers already have facilities in a
locality, is that locality safe from claims under this provision, or does any
provider effectively shut out of a town have a claim under this provision?
What if a town is small enough that facilities located in other municipalities
can service its entire area? These provisions demand considerable elucidation
98
before they transform into judicially enforceable standards.
The explicit grant of a cause of action "in any court of competent
jurisdiction" compels the conclusion that the TCA was intended to grant
providers at least some enforceable rights. However, it may be that only the
procedural requirements of written decisions and substantial evidence on a
written record are sufficiently clear and binding to be enforced in § 1983 "and
laws" actions. Although all courts addressing the matter have concluded that
the TCA creates enforceable rights, there is good reason to question whether its
substantive standards and its procedural requirement that applications be acted
upon within a "reasonable period of time" create the kind of binding legal
obligations that can be enforced with § 1983 "and laws" claims.
b. Does the TCA's Remedial Scheme Preclude the Application of § 1983?
The TCA's remedial scheme presents more difficult questions concerning
the availability of § 1983 "and laws" actions. There are several reasons to
believe that Congress may not have intended TCA enforcement through a §
1983 "and laws" action. First, the TCA itself creates a court action for
violations of its terms, rendering the § 1983 action unnecessary, at least to
achieve the primary goal of the TCA. 99 The fact that the TCA itself explicitly
provides for a cause of action in "any court of competent jurisdiction," and in
some cases via a petition before the FCC, means that the TCA provides ample
internal means for enforcing its provisions. 100 Presumably, injunctive relief
tower permit and explicitly stating that the TCA does not displace traditional zoning
considerations such as aesthetics); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423,
425 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing the opposition among residents).
98 The fact that courts have disagreed substantially over what these provisions means
supports our argument that they are too indefinite to create binding legal obligations.
99 PrimeCo Personal Communications Ltd. Partnership v. Lake County Fla., No. 97-208CIV-10B, 1998 WL 565036 at *7 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 1998) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No.
104-458, at 206 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 124, which states that the
purpose of the TCA is to "provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector development of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening
all telecommunications markets to competition").
"0 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (Supp. IV, 1998) (permitting an action in "any court of
competent jurisdiction" by any person adversely affected by any act or failure to act by a
state or local government that is inconsistent with § 332(c)(7)(B) and a petition before the
FCC by any person adversely affected by any act or failure to act by a state or local
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under the TCA would be available, for example, if a locality were to
discriminate among providers or deny a permit application without a written
0
decision or record.' '
Cases brought under both the TCA and § 1983 demonstrate that § 1983 is
unnecessary and duplicative. Many courts cases vindicate the rights granted
by § 332(c)(7) without relying upon any other remedial statute such as §
1983.102 Because § 332(c)(7) explicitly creates its own private enforcement
mechanism, the inference that Congress intended to allow § 1983 "and laws"
03
enforcement is weak.1
In some respects, § 332(c)(7) is distinguishable from other statutes under
which the court has not found congressional preclusion. 0 4 In Blessing, for
instance, the Court found that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act did not
provide a remedy so comprehensive as to preclude liability under § 1983.105
The Court specifically relied upon the fact that Title IV-D lacked the private
enforcement mechanism present in the statutes at issue in both Smith v.
Robinson and Sea Clammers. 10 6 Both Wright and Virginia Hospital Ass'n
involved statutes that relied on executive branch enforcement with little, if any,
possibility for private enforcement, and even then it was only through state
remedies. 0 7 In contrast, § 332(c)(7) relies entirely on private enforcement.
government that is inconsistent with § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv), the environmental effects clause).
10' Courts have held that injunctions are the appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Cellular Tel.
Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 495-97 (2d Cir. 1999) (granting an injunction
ordering the Town of Oyster Bay to issue permits to Cellular Telephone Company for the
construction of cell sites because of a violation of the environmental effects clause of the
TCA, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv), and noting that the majority of district courts have
determined that an injunction is an appropriate remedy).
102 See PrimeCo Personal Communications. Ltd. Partnership, 1998 WL 565036, at *1415 (granting declaratory and injunctive relief under the TCA and dismissing the § 1983
claim as moot); BellSouth Mobility, Inc. v. Gwinnett County Ga., 944 F. Supp. 923, (N.D.
Ga. 1996) (issuing writ of mandamus solely on TCA grounds because BellSouth Mobility
dropped the § 1983 claim before trial); Cellular Tel. Co., 166 F.3d at 495-97 (granting an
order to issue permits under the TCA).
113See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108-09 (1989)
(discussing the availability of § 1983 to enforce the National Labor Relations Act).
"o See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 348 (1997) (holding that the limited
enforcement scheme of Title IV-D does not preclude enforcement through § 1983); Wilder
v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990) (finding that the Medicaid Act provides
federal rights enforceable through § 1983); Golden State, 493 U.S. at 109 (determining that
the National Labor Relations Act creates § 1983 rights against governmental interference
with labor relations); Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418,
432 (1987) (finding that that the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act creates rights
enforceable through a § 1983 claim).
105See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347-48; see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
106 See id.
107 Compare Wright, 479 U.S. at 428 (finding that the Brooke Amendment to the
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Furthermore, § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) appears to contemplate not a limited state
remedy but, rather, an expansive federal one that must be expedited in any
court of competent jurisdiction.10 8
There are also, however, good arguments against interpreting the TCA to
foreclose § 1983 relief. Although injunctions directly under the TCA may
remedy any and all violations of that statute, the TCA is lacking in the details
that have led the Court to hold, in other contexts, that private remedies in
particular statutes foreclose § 1983 relief. Although the TCA creates rights
and provides an action in "any court of competent jurisdiction," it provides no
explicit guidance on what remedies and defenses are available in such actions.
Furthermore, it contains no exhaustion requirement and it does not limit
actions to any particular forum. The TCA lacks the procedural details that
have led courts in other contexts to hold that a § 1983 "and laws" remedy
would be incompatible with enforcement of the statute itself. In short, under
the Court's "and laws" jurisprudence, the TCA may be insufficiently
comprehensive to create the inference that Congress intended to foreclose the §
1983 remedy for violations of the TCA under color of law.
This analysis illustrates the importance of the Court's presumption that the
"and laws" remedy is available unless Congress indicates that it intends to
preclude it. 109 Section 1983 liability for violations of the TCA goes well
beyond injunctive relief for wrongful permit denials. Because § 1983 is a tortlike remedy, it can include damages against individual officials and local
attorney's fees against both individuals and
governments, as well as
government entities under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of
1976.110 There is no indication in the TCA or its legislative history that
Congress thought about any remedies beyond orders to comply with the TCA.
Another note on the "and laws" question is in order. Our two arguments
against recognizing the "and laws" action may appear to be in tension with
each other. If the TCA's substantive provisions do not create enforceable
rights, how can we also argue that the TCA's own remedial scheme is
sufficient on its own and indicates congressional intent to preclude the § 1983
"and laws" action? Can we really hold both of those beliefs at once?
We believe that any apparent inconsistency disappears on close examination
of our argument. Congress clearly stated in § 332(c)(7) that its provisions are
enforceable in court.' I Insofar as any of these provisions is definite enough
Housing Act creates individual rights sufficient to support a § 1983 claim), with Va. Hosp.

Ass'n, 496 U.S. at 521 (finding that the Medicaid Act does not preempt § 1983 because the
Medicaid Act lacks any provision for private judicial or administrative enforcement). See
also Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346-48.
108 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (Supp. IV 1998).
"9 See, e.g., Blessing, 520 U.S. at 346 (noting that the burden is on the one attempting to

preempt § 1983 to show that the statute in question expressly preempts § 1983 or that the
scheme of Congress in the statute in question is inconsistent with enforcement via § 1983).
'1o See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
...See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
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to create binding legal obligations, the TCA's own remedial scheme, coupled
with the lack of any indication that Congress intended to allow victorious TCA
plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees, renders the § 1983 "and laws" claim
particularly inappropriate in this context. Even if some or all of the TCA's
provisions turn out to be too indefinite to be legally binding and enforceable,
Congress still tried to provide a remedy within the TCA itself. Congress's
failure to provide a completely internal remedy does not change the fact that,
as far as the existence of remedies is concerned, Congress precluded the §
1983 remedy under prevailing standards.
An additional reason for holding that TCA's procedures do not supplant §
1983 claims is the TCA's savings clause. In AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City

of Atlanta,112 in a now-vacated decision of an Eleventh Circuit panel, the court
held in favor of allowing § 1983 "and laws" claims against local governments
to redress violations of the TCA cell tower siting provisions,"1 3 largely because
TCA section 601(c)(1) contains the following savings clause: "No implied
effect. This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed
to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, state, or local law unless expressly so
provided in such Act or amendments."'" 4 The panel found that the "plain
meaning" of this language is that the TCA does not supersede § 1983's "and
laws" provision because, presumably, that would allow the TCA to "modify,
impair, or supersede Federal law," 115 i.e. § 1983's "and laws" clause."16 The
panel noted that there was also a savings clause in Sea Clammers, where §
1983 was held inapplicable , but it distinguished that decision on the ground
that the savings clause in Sea Clammers was narrower, saving "any right
which any person

...

may have under any statute or common law to seek

enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other

'12 210 F.3d 1322, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that the issue of whether the TCA
precludes an action under § 1983 is one of first impression among the courts of appeals),
vacated for lack ofjurisdiction, 223 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir. 2000), reinstated, 250 F.3d 1307
(1 Ith Cir. 2001), vacated and reh 'g en banc granted, No. 00-15885, 2001 WL 901250 (1 Ith
Cir. Aug. 10, 2001), and appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 00-15885, 2001 WL
1049229 (1lth Cir. Sept. 13, 2001).
113The panel noted that all district courts addressing the issue had held that the TCA
creates enforceable federal rights, 210 F.3d. at 1325 & n.4 (citing cases) but that "there is a
split among the district courts about whether the TCA provides a comprehensive remedial
scheme supplanting § 1983." See id. at 1327 & n.7 (citing cases).
114 AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 210 F.3d at 1328 (quoting
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(c)(1), 110 Stat. 143 (1996)).
The panel noted that section 601 is contained in the historical and statutory notes appended
to 47 U.S.C. § 152 (Supp. IV 1998) and that although it was not codified in § 152, it was
enacted into law and is binding authority. Id. at 1328 & n.8.
115Telecommunications Act § 601(c)(1), 110 Stat. 143 (1996).
116 See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 210 F.3d at 1328 (refusing to
"second guess" the plain meaning of the savings clause).

2001]

SECTION 1983's "AND LAWS" CLAUSE

relief .... "117 Given that the savings clause in Sea Clammers purported to save
the right to seek "any other relief," the panel's distinction does not appear to
be very persuasive. 118
More importantly, there is reason to doubt that savings clauses like this
should have any effect on § 1983 "and laws" claims. It is odd reasoning to say
that when a court holds that an "and laws" claim is unavailable to enforce a
particular statute because of that statute's own remedial scheme, this amounts
to allowing that statute to "modify, impair, or supersede" § 1983. The
existence of the "and laws" claim in the first place depends on the particular
statute. Finding that Congress's intent behind the particular statute as a whole
is not to contemplate enforcement beyond the enforcement mechanisms
contained in the statute itself does not impair § 1983. If the particular statute
did not exist, there would be no "and laws" claim, and no one would imagine
that the failure of Congress to pass the particular statute had any effect on §
1983. Again, it is only the presumption that Congress intended the "and laws"
remedy to be available that allows a court to reason that disallowing the "and
laws" remedy amounts, in effect, to a partial repeal of § 1983.
c. Cases Deciding Whether the TCA Allows § 1983 Action
In addition to the Eleventh Circuit's decision holding that the TCA's savings
clause means that the § 1983 "and laws" action is preserved, at least eleven
additional federal cases, all in district courts, have squarely faced the issue of
awarding § 1988 attorney's fees and costs in suits under § 1983 and §
332(c)(7).11 9 None of these cases relies upon the savings clause. Although all
17

Id. at 1328 (quoting the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (e)).

Another statute at issue in Sea Clammers, the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972, had a very similar savings clause. See 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5) (1994);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 7 & n.10
(1981).
I8 The panel
pointed out that the Sea Clammers Court "discounted the savings clause
language because legislative history clearly revealed that Congress intended to preserve
further enforcement of specific antipollution standards only." AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v.
City of Atlanta, 210 F.3d at 1328. The Court's mode of construction in Sea Clammers
effectively holds that when the plain meaning is against you, rely on the legislative history.
The Eleventh Circuit's panel ignored the Supreme Court's relatively narrow reading of the
savings clause in light of the panel's view that the overall remedial scheme of the statute in
question in Sea Clammers was comprehensive enough to preclude § 1983 "and laws"
claims. See id. at 1328.
119 See Omnipoint Communications Enters. v. Charlestown Township., No. CIV. A. 98CV-6563, 2000 WL 128703, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2000) (denying § 1983 "and laws"
claims for damages and attorney's fees under § 1988); Omnipoint Communications. Enters.
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (denying § 1983 "and laws"
claims for damages and attorney's fees under § 1988); AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 1999), (denying § 1983 "and laws" claims for
damages and attorney's fees under § 1988), appealdismissed per stipulation, No. 00-15885,
2001 WL 1049229 (11 th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001) (For the complete procedural history of the
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these cases agree that § 332(c)(7) creates a federal right which § 1983 might
ordinarily redress, they disagree as to whether § 332(c)(7) creates a
comprehensive enforcement mechanism, precluding litigation under § 1983.120
None of them expressly addresses whether suits in this context present special
circumstances that render attorney's fee awards unjust. However, two cases
actually award attorney's fees and costs.'21
Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton122 forms the basis for the first line of
cases that allows recovery of attorney's fees and costs under § 1988. Plaintiff
Sprint Spectrum L.P. ("Sprint") sued the Town of Easton, Massachusetts, after
the Easton Zoning Board denied Sprint's application for a building permit for a
150 foot tall communications tower. 123 The town denied the permit on the
grounds that the tower was proposed for an "already congested area" and that
24
town residents could already receive wireless services from other providers.
Massachusetts District Court Chief Judge Tauro held that the town's denial
violated the TCA by restricting competition and by discriminating "between
125
providers of equivalent services."

Eleventh Circuit's action regarding this case, see supra note 28.); Omnipoint
Communications, Inc. v. Penn Forest Township, 42 F. Supp. 2d 493, 509 (M.D. Pa. 1999)
(denying § 1983 "and laws" claims for damages and attorney's fees under § 1988),; Cellco
Partnership v. Hess, No. CIV. A. 98-3985, 1999 WL 178364, at *6 (E.D. Pa. March 30,
1999) (holding that the TCA does not preclude § 1983 "and laws" claims); Omnipoint
Communications Enters. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. CIV. A. 98-3299, 1998 WL 764762, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 1998) (holding that the TCA does not preclude § 1983 "and laws"
claims); APT Minneapolis, Inc. v. City of Maplewood, No. CIV.97-2082(JRT/RLE), 1998
WL 634224, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 12, 1998) (allowing APT's § 1983 "and laws" claim for
attorney's fees under § 1988); Nat'l Telecomm. Advisors, Inc. v. City of Chicopee, 16 F.
Supp. 2d 117, 122 (D. Mass. 1998) (Ponsor, J.) (denying § 1983 claims for damages and
attorney's fees under § 1988); Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 3 F.
Supp. 2d 178, 186 (D. Conn. 1998) (Goettel, J.) (granting damages under § 1983 without
analysis); Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 995 F. Supp. 52, 61 (D. Conn.
1998) (Goettel, J.) [hereinafter Smart SMR 1] (holding that the TCA does not preclude §
1983 claims); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47, 53 (D. Mass. 1997)
(Tauro, C.J.) (holding that the TCA does not preclude § 1983 claims).
20 Compare National Telecomm. Advisors, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d at 122-23 (finding
preclusion without discussing Sprint Spectrum L.P.), with Cellco Partnership,3 F. Supp. 2d
at 186 (finding no preclusion, relying on Smart SMR I); Smart SMR 1, 995 F. Supp at 61
(finding no preclusion, relying on Sprint Spectrum L.P.), and Sprint Spectrum L.P., 982 F.
Supp. at 53 (finding no preclusion).
121See Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 143, 154 (D.
Conn. 1998) (Goettel, J.) [hereinafter Smart SMR Il] (awarding Smart SMR $9,411.93 in
attorney's fees and costs); APT Minneapolis, Inc., 1998 WL at *8 (granting APT's request
for attorney's fees and costs under § 1988).
122 982 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1997).
123 Sprint Spectrum L.P., 982 F. Supp. at 49,
124 Id. at

51.

125 Id. (referring to § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I)).
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After finding a violation of the TCA, Chief Judge Tauro turned to whether
Sprint's case could be brought under § 1983, which would lay the basis for an
award of attorney's fees and costs. After outlining the Supreme Court's "and
laws" jurisprudence, the court held in just three brief and conclusory sentences,
with little analysis, that the § 1983 action was available. The court stated: (1)
26
that § 332(c)(7) neither implicitly nor explicitly precludes a § 1983 action,
(2) that § 332(c)(7) does not contain a comprehensive enforcement mechanism
displacing § 1983,127 (3) that the TCA creates substantive rights,' 28 and (4) that
"enforcement of Plaintiff's rights under the TCA through a § 1983 action does
not 'strain judicial competence'. ...,,9 The court thus granted summary
judgment for Sprint and issued an injunction. 130 Chief Judge Tauro's § 1983
holding opened the door to § 1988 attorney fee awards, unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust.
13 1
The next case, Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Zoning Commission,
("Smart SMR ") revolved around the plaintiff's attempt to place a cellular
phone antenna on an existing 110 foot tall lattice tower currently serving as a
windmill. 132 Nextel-the name under which the plaintiff was doing businessentered into a lease agreement with the tower's owners to modify the tower
appropriately. 3 3 On April 18, 1997, Nextel applied to the Zoning Commission
of the Town of Stratford ("Commission") for a special permit to begin
construction. 134 The Commission held a hearing on May 20, 1997, and denied
126Id. at 53 ("The TCA does not implicitly or explicitly foreclose § 1983 suits.").
127

Id. ("More particularly, the TCA does not provide a comprehensive enforcement

scheme intended to supplant a § 1983 remedy.").
128 Although all courts agree that the TCA creates enforceable rights, the court's analysis
of the issue in this case is less than satisfying. The only support the court relied upon for its
holding that the TCA creates a right is the provision in the TCA that allows victims of
violations of the TCA to seek relief in court. Id. ("In addition, the TCA creates substantive
rights by providing that '[any person adversely affected by any final action ... by a...
local government or any instrumentality thereof ...may ...commence action in any court
of competent jurisdiction."') This provision, creating a court action, is irrelevant as to
whether any particular provision of the TCA is definite enough to create an enforceable
right under the Supreme Court's "and laws" jurisprudence. Further, Chief Judge Tauro did
not comment on whether the fact that the TCA itself so clearly provides for a judicial
remedy has any bearing on whether the TCA's own remedial scheme displaces the "and
laws" remedy. The opinion merely states, without analyzing the provisions of the TCA, that
the TCA does not contain a comprehensive remedial scheme.
29 Id. at 53 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997). "Given the
foregoing, as well as the fact that enforcement of Plaintiff's rights under the TCA through a
§ 1983 action does not 'strain judicial competence,' a § 1983 remedy is available in this
instance." Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
130Id.

131Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 995 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1998).
132 Smart SMR
133
134

See id.
Id.

1,995 F. Supp. at 55.
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the permit three weeks later, on June 12. Like the plaintiff in the Sprint
Spectrum L.P. case, Nextel sought relief from the Commission's decision
under both § 332(c)(7) and § 1983.135 After granting summary judgment to
Nextel on four of its five claims under § 332(c)(7),136 the court addressed the §
1983 claim. The court reviewed the § 1983 "and laws" precedent and
concluded: "Because we agree with the court's reasoning in [Sprint Spectrum
L.P. 137], we find that a section 1983 claim is available to Nextel.' 138 Not
39
surprisingly, the court granted summary judgment on Nextel's § 1983 claim,
vacated the zoning commission's permit denial, and ordered the Commission
40
to grant Nextel's permit.
After prevailing on summary judgment in Smart SMR I, Nextel moved for
attorney's fees and costs under § 1988.141 Although the court devoted most of
its attention in Smart SMR H to determining the reasonableness and amount of
fees and costs, 142 it also discussed Nextel's eligibility for fees. 143 The town
asserted two bases for denying fees: (1) The award should be denied because
of "special circumstances," namely, that granting fees would discourage
zoning commissions from exercising their normal zoning authority in wireless
facility siting issues, virtually compelling them to grant all permit requests;
and (2) Awarding fees would penalize municipalities in a way that Congress
did not intend.144 The court rejected both arguments.
The court found no authority to support the town's "special circumstances"
argument ("the chilling theory"). 145 The court found that the chilling theory
was based on the false premise that providers would prevail in all such
actions. 146 The court concluded that awards of attorneys' fees could encourage
compliance with the TCA: "Contrary to defendant's conclusions, we find that
the threat of attorneys' fees could influence zoning authorities to ensure that
147
their decisions comply with the Telecommunications Act's requirements."'
As to the town's second argument against fees, the court could find no support
135

See id.

136 See

id. at 56-60 (granting summary judgment to plaintiff on two claims under §
332(c)(7)(B)(iii), one claim under 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), and one claim under 332(c)(7)(B)(iv)
and granting summary judgment to defendant on one claim under 332(c)(7)(B)(iv)).
137 Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1997).
"I Id.at 61.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 62 (requiring that a permit be granted under such terms and conditions as

might reasonably be prescribed).
141 See Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 143, 147 (D. Conn.
1998) [hereinafter Smart SMR II].
142 See id. at 147-53.
143 See id. at 147-48.
144 Id.at 148.
145 Id.
146 Id.

147 Id.
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in the TCA's legislative history, and it concluded that even without
mentioning attorney's fees, the legislative history supported the contrary
conclusion: "Rather, one of the Telecommunications Act's purposes is to
provide a vehicle for wireless service providers to sue local zoning authorities
based on any adverse decisions that fail to comply with the provisions of
section 332(c)(7)."' 48 The court awarded Nextel $9,411.93 of its $40,444.52
49
application for attorneys' fees. 1
That same year, the same court decided Cellco Partnershipv. Town Plan &
Zoning Commission150 ("Cellco"). In Cellco, plaintiff Cellco Partnership
attempted to fill cellular coverage gaps in the Unionville section of
Farmington, Connecticut, by using a church steeple. In the 1950s, the First
Church of Christ of Farmington, Inc. ("Church") had removed its
5
approximately one hundred foot tall steeple because of safety concerns.' '
Cellco entered into a lease with the Church that contemplated rebuilding the
steeple as a camouflaged 135 foot tall antenna.' 52 On June 20, 1997, Cellco
submitted the necessary application to the Planning and Zoning Commission
("Zoning Commission"). 53 The Zoning Commission held a public hearing in

July and denied the application in September, 54 on the basis that "the height
and scale of the proposed steeple would not be in character with the
neighborhood."'' 55 Cellco promptly sought relief under both § 332(c)(7) and §
1983.156 The court resolved the § 1983 claim in two short paragraphs, after
finding against the Zoning Commission on the § 332(c)(7) claims.' 57 The
148
149

Id.
See id. at 147, 154. The court disallowed the majority of the fees Nextel requested on

various grounds, including failure to establish the prevailing hourly rates for the attorneys
and paralegals who worked on the case, failure to establish the necessity of many of the
hours spent-the court found, e.g., that the lawyers spent excessive time preparing the
complaint and that they even put in 1.5 hour for research on default judgments only three
weeks after filing the complaint when there was no indication that the defendant would
default-and failure to document adequately the hours worked-the court applied a thirty
percent across-the-board reduction for the vagueness of the records submitted. There is no
indication that the reduction was influenced by the TCA's effect on local governments or
any other concerns related particularly to the TCA. See id. at 152-153.
110 3 F. Supp. 2d 178 (D. Conn. 1998).
151See id. at 181.
152 See id.
153 See id.

114 See id.
155 id. at 182.
156 See id.
' Id. at 182, 187. The court found that the Zoning Commission's stated reasons failed
the substantial evidence test required by § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). See id. at 182, 184. The court
ruled against Cellco's other allegations that the Commission's decision (1) violated §
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) because it had the effect of prohibiting wireless services and (2) violated
332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) because it unreasonably discriminated against this provider compared to
other wireless providers. See id. at 184-87.
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court stated, based on Smart SMR 1 ,
'58 that § 332(c)(7) does not preclude
160
claims under § 1983 and it cited Sprint Spectrum L.P. 159 as an example.
Rather than remand the case to the Zoning Commission, the court vacated the
permit denial and ordered the Zoning Commission to issue a permit to Cellco
within twenty days. 161
In all three of these cases, the courts found that § 332(c)(7) creates a federal
right that is enforceable in § 1983 actions. Section 1988 attorney's fees awards
are then treated as virtually automatic. In our view, this line of cases, starting
with Sprint Spectrum L.P., insufficiently examines the TCA under the Supreme
Court's "and laws" jurisprudence and disregards the possibility that courts
have discretion to deny or limit attorney's fees under § 1988.
One court has recognized these shortcomings and has carefully examined
the difficult issues raised by § 1983 claims to enforce § 332(c)(7). In National
Telecommunication Advisors, Inc. v. City of Chicopee,162 the court looked

carefully at whether successful plaintiffs should recover attorney's fees and
163
costs pursuant to § 1988 in a § 1983 claim brought to enforce § 332(c)(7).
In February, 1996, National Telecommunication Advisors, Inc. ("NTA")
applied to the Board of Aldermen for the City of Chicopee, Massachusetts
("Board") for a zoning variance to construct a cellular antenna on an industrial
site. 64 The Board's zoning committee recommended that the application be
denied.165 Over a year later, on October 7, 1997, after several further
meetings, the full Board denied the request-by a vote of six to four. 166 The
Board memorialized the meeting in a handwritten note indicating that it
167
wished to save the site for a "true industrial use."'

NTA promptly brought an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts under both § 332(c)(7)1 68 and § 1983, seeking an
injunction and a writ of mandamus compelling the issuance of a permit for the
building site, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees and
158 Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 995 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1998).
'59Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass 1997).
160 See id. at 186.

161See id. at 187 (determining that remand was not appropriate and would only cause
further delay).
162 16 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1998) [hereinafter NTA] (discussing the qualifications

for an award of attorney's fees).
163 See id. at 119-23.
See id. at 117-18.
165See id. at 118.
166 See id.at 118-19.
'6

167 Id. at 119.
16 See id. at 118 (stating that NTA claimed that the Board's decision violated §
332(c)(7) because it was not supported by substantial evidence contained in a written
record, see § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii), and it had the effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless

services, see § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(1).
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CoStS. 169 The court scheduled the case for an expedited hearing 7 ° on October
27, 1997, but the parties settled the § 332(c)(7) claims before the hearing. 17 1
The only remaining issue was NTA's claim for attorney's fees and costs under
§ 1988, on which NTA then moved for summary judgment. This court
72
analyzed the § 1983 claim in detail, noting that, under Maine v. Thiboutot, §
1983 is an available remedy for federal statutory violations. 73 However, the
court said plaintiffs must show, under Blessing v. Freestone:174 (1) that the
statute creates a substantial federal right and (2) that Congress did not create a
comprehensive enforcement mechanism within the statute, which would
75
indicate congressional intent to preclude § 1983 enforcement.
The NTA court applied Blessing's three-part version of the two-part test first
set forth in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles 176 and concluded
that the TCA creates rights sufficiently definite to be enforceable in a § 1983
"and laws" action. Under this version of the test, the "and laws" plaintiffs
must prove that the statute: (1) binds the government rather than simply
expresses a congressional preference; (2) protects an interest which is not "too
vague and amorphous" and thus "beyond the competence of the judiciary to
enforce;" and (3) was intended to benefit the plaintiff. 177 On the first factor,
the court held that the TCA's specific provisions, requiring local zoning
commissions to make written findings supported by substantial evidence in a
written record, 78 were so clearly intended to bind state and local governments
that "[n]o interpretation of the statute could colorably suggest that this
language merely expressed a 'Congressional [sic] preference.""1 79 The court
found the second Golden State factor was satisfied because the statute itself
provides for judicial review,1 80 and its legislative history indicates that local
16 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (Supp. 1998) ("The court shall hear and decide such

169 See NTA,
170

action on an expedited basis.").
171See NTA, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
172448 U.S. 1(1980).
171See NTA, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (citing the holding in Thiboutot, 448

U.S. at 6, for the

proposition that "in some circumstances, § 1983 is available to enforce violations of federal
statutes and that § 1983 remedies are not limited to statutes enacted pursuant to the civil
rights or equal protection provisions of the Constitution").
174520 U.S. 329, 348 (1997).
175See NTA, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (stating that a plaintiff must assert a federal right
violation and show no congressional intent to create a comprehensive enforcement
mechanism that precludes § 1983 remedies); see also id. (outlining the three factors courts
should consider when deciding whether a statute provides for a federal right).
176 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (setting forth the two-part test).
177See NTA, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (citing Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 for the threepart test that plaintiffs must meet to receive relief under § 1983).
171See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (Supp. IV 1998).
179NTA, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
80 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
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zoning commission decisions should be measured by "the traditional
[substantial evidence on a written record] standard used for judicial review of
agency actions."1 81 The third factor of the Golden State test was met because82
NTA was "precisely the sort of plaintiff the TCA was intended to benefit.'
Because the TCA met all three factors of the Golden State test, the court
concluded that the TCA did indeed create federal rights cognizable under §
1983.183

The court then turned to a careful examination of whether the TCA's
enforcement provisions indicate that Congress did not intend to allow § 1983
"and laws" claims to enforce the TCA. The NTA court noted that Congress
can preclude § 1983 enforcement either explicitly in the statute or implicitly,
by creating a comprehensive enforcement mechanism within the statute which
is incompatible with § 1983 enforcement. 8 4 To determine whether the TCA
created a comprehensive enforcement mechanism that precluded § 1983
enforcement, the court contrasted two cases in which the Supreme Court had
found preclusion, Sea Clammers185 and Smith v. Robinson, 186 with Blessing v.
Freestone,187 in which it had not. Based upon this examination, as well as on
other First Circuit precedent, 88 the NTA court made four specific findings.
First, the court concluded that the absence of fee-shifting provisions in such a
clear and detailed remedial provision indicates Congressional intent not to
shift fees. 189 Second, the existence of a specific provision regarding judicial
review is analogous to the statutory procedures at issue in Sea Clammers and
in Smith, and it should be interpreted similarly to preclude an "and laws"
action under § 1983.190 Third, the TCA's judicial review provision is similar
181 H.R.

CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124,

223; see NTA, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
812See NTA, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 120-21.
183 See id. at 121.
184See id. (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)).
115 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, I1
(1981) (holding that §1983 does not create a private right of action under the FWPCA or the
MPRSA).
186 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984) (concluding that petitioners would not be entitled to
attorney's fees even if they had made additional constitutional claims that could be brought
under § 1983).
187 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
'88 See Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 980 F.2d 1, 5-6 (Ist Cir. 1992) (holding that the
remedies under the Safe Drinking Water Act preclude § 1983 claims); Garcia v. Cecos Int'l,
Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 78 (Ist Cir.1985) (holding that the remedies under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 preclude § 1983 claims).
89 See NTA, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 122 ("Given this carefully drafted provision, and the
absence of any indicia of contrary congressional intent, it is manifest that Congress provided
precisely the remedies that it considered appropriate when drafting the TCA.").
I" See id. (noting the strong resemblance that the case under consideration bears to Smith
and Sea Clamnmers).
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to two provisions (of another statute) that the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit had held to preclude § 1983 "and laws" actions.1 9' Fourth, the court
found that allowing an "and laws" action in this situation "trivializes [§ 1983]
and is inconsistent with its intent" because, in this context, § 1983 added
nothing to the plaintiffs cause of action but rather functioned only to allow a
fee award. 192 The court seemed to say that the "and laws" action should not
be allowed just to add fees, because it is apparent in such situations that
Congress has provided a sufficient and complete remedy elsewhere. The court
thus denied NTA's motion for attorney's fees and costs without examining
whether § 1988 provided independent reasons for denying fees.
The NTA case on one side, and the Smart SMR 1193 and Sprint Spectrum
L.P. 194 cases on the other, exemplify the division among the courts over
allowing § 1983 "and laws" claims to enforce the TCA's provisions
regarding zoning for cellular facilities. Building on this foundation,
subsequent case law reveals that most courts have followed the reasoning in
NTA. 195 However, substantial uncertainty remains concerning the ultimate
resolution of these issues.196
B. Attorney's Fees

Because § 1988 allows the award of attorney's fees to virtually all
prevailing § 1983 plaintiffs, one might question the wisdom of presuming
generally that the "and laws" remedy is available and the wisdom of specific
judicial holdings that the "and laws" remedy is available to victims of
violations of the TCA's cellular siting provisions. Without specific evidence
that Congress intended to allow attorney's fees to victorious communications
providers in TCA enforcement actions, courts in the United States ordinarily
would not make such awards. Even if Congress meant to allow for the entire
range of judicial remedies by permitting victims of TCA violations to

"I9 See id. (comparing § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) with similar provisions held to preclude § 1983
enforcement in the Safe Drinking Water Act at issue in Mattoon, 980 F.2d at 78 and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act at issue in Garcia, 761 F.2d at 5-6).
192Id. 122-23.
193 Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 995 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1998).
194 Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass 1997).
195 See Omnipoint Communications Enters. v. Charlestown Township, No. CIV.A.98CV-6563, 2000 WL 128703, at *4 (citing numerous cases following the reasoning in NTA).
196 Because the appeal in AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta was dismissed, it
remains to be seen whether the Eleventh Circuit panel's reasoning will ultimately be
accepted. See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text (discussing AT&T Wireless
PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 210 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated for lack of
jurisdiction, 223 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir. 2000), reinstated, 250 F.3d 1307 (11 th Cir. 2001),
vacated and reh'g en banc granted, No. 00-15885, 2001 WL 901250 (11 th Cir. Aug. 10,

2001), and appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 00-15885, 2001 WL 1049229 (11 th Cir.
Sept. 13, 2001).
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"commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction," 197 attorney's fees
are not within the usual panoply of American. judicial remedies, absent
specific statutory authorization. 198
Historically, American courts have followed the rule that each litigant bear
its own fees and costs, the so-called "American rule."' 199 In Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 200 the Supreme Court held that federal
courts could not award attorney's fees without congressional authorization. 20
The Court expressed disapproval of a wide range of attorney's fees awards,
including awards in civil rights cases. 20 2 Congress responded by enacting §
1988, granting courts discretion to award fees and costs to the prevailing
party-except for the United States-in any suit to enforce certain named
statutes, including § 1983.203 In subsequent cases, courts have held that
virtually all § 1983 plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, including
2 4
plaintiffs bringing "and laws" claims. 0

By enacting § 1988, Congress recognized both that many of the civil rights
laws passed since 1866 rely entirely on private enforcement and that the
enforcing citizen often cannot afford to hire a lawyer. 20 5 The Congress that
passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 expressed concern
19747 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (Supp. IV 1998).

'98See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(stating the American rule that "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser"); S.REP. No. 94-1011, at 4, 6 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5911, 5913 (citing the relevant legislative history of § 1988 for
the proposition that § 1988 "creates no startling new remedy" but rather simply meets the
requirements for previously developed remedies).
"' See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. 240 at 247; Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (disallowing counsel's fees as part of the damages awarded).
200 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
201 See id. at 263-64 (noting that courts would have difficulty granting attorney's fees in

connection with violations of important, as opposed to unimportant, statutes, without
legislative guidance).
202 See id. at 270, n.46 (citing lower court rulings that the Court believed erroneous).
203 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. IV 1998). Section 1988(b) currently provides:
(b) Attorney's fees
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title,, [sic]
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity such
officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such
action was clearly in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (first, second, and third brackets in original).
204 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (following a plain language interpretation
of § 1988 to find the prevailing plaintiffs eligible for attorney's fees).
205 See S.REP. No.94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.
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over the inability of impecunious civil rights plaintiffs to hire attorneys and the
consequences of that inability for civil rights enforcement. 20 6 The expressed
concern was that, unless such citizens "recover what it costs them to vindicate
207
these rights in court," "the Nation's fundamental laws" would not be upheld.
Fee awards form an "integral part of the remedy necessary to achieve
compliance with our statutory policies.... Not to award [them] would be
tantamount to repealing the Act itself by frustrating its basic purpose." 20 8 The
strong presumption that plaintiffs who achieve significant relief in civil rights
cases are entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988 is an accurate and appropriate
reading of the statute and of Congress's intent.
Claims by telecommunications firms that zoning authorities are violating
federal communications statutes are not within the universe of concerns that
led Congress to pass § 1988. Unless one perceives a civil rights violation any
time a state or local official violates a federal statute, perhaps the presumption
in favor of attorney's fees should be rethought in "and laws" § 1983 cases. As
Judge Carnes has stated, the justifications for § 1988 fees, giving civil rights
victims effective access to the courts and giving members of the bar an
economic incentive to act as "private attorneys general" by aiding civil rights
enforcement, do not apply to non-civil rights "and laws" claims like the claim
to enforce the TCA's cell siting provisions. 20 9 Given the exceptional nature of
attorney's fees awards to victorious plaintiffs in courts in the United States, it
would be appropriate to limit the application of the attorney's fees statute.
Such a limitation might include only those cases about which Congress was
2 10
concerned, or it might give "discretion," the word that appears in § 1988(b),
to courts to deny awards in particular cases or categories of cases, such as "and
laws" claims generally or claims to enforce business rights such as the TCA
cell siting provisions.
206 See id.
207 Id.
208

Id. (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973) (discussing the Labor-Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act)); see generally Mark. D. Boveri, Note, Surveying the Law of
Fee Awards Under the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1293, 1293-95

(1984) (recapping the legislative history which emphasized that precluding the award of fees
to private citizens with insufficient funding for lawsuits would frustrate the goal of the civil
rights laws); Michael J.McNamara, Note, Judicial Discretion and the 1976 Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act: What Special Circumstances Render an Award Unjust?, 51

FORDHAM L. REV. 320, 322-24 (1982) (providing background on the purpose of provisions
that shift the burden of paying attorney's fees onto the losing party in the litigation).
209 See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 210 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Carnes, J.
concurring specially) (noting that because AT & T Wireless is neither a civil rights victim
nor without sufficient funds to pay for attorney's fees, it does not fall within scope of the
fee-shifting provision of § 1988), vacatedfor lack ofjurisdiction, 223 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir.
2000), reinstated,250 F.3d 1307 (11 th Cir. 2001), vacated and reh'g en banc granted,No.
00-15885, 2001 WL 901250 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2001), and appeal dismissed per
stipulation, No. 00-15885, 2001 WL 1049229 (11 th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001).

210 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. IV 1998).

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:735

The language of § 1988 and its legislative history may provide bases for
allowing courts to consider whether fees in cell siting cases are appropriate
even if an "and laws" claim is successful. The statute provides that "the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's
fee ....
,,211
Section 1988's legislative history explains that district courts have
discretion to deny fees if "special circumstances would render such an award
unjust. ' 2 12 Courts and commentators have disagreed over what constitutes
"special circumstances." Some commentators argue that courts simply have
"discretion only to determine the amount of the fee award and not its
availability. '2 13 In cases decided before the Supreme Court held that fee
awards to victorious § 1983 plaintiffs are virtually automatic, some courts
denied attorney's fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs under a trio of
standards known as: (1) the "bright-prospects" test; (2) the private attorney
2 14
general theory; and (3) the totality-of-circumstances test.
The "bright-prospects test" emerged from the Second Circuit's decision in
Zarcone v. Perry.215 The Zarcone court stated that § 1988 was intended to
remove financial barriers to individuals asserting their civil rights. 216 In
Zarcone, however, the court held that because the plaintiff had a strong case
with significant damages and had no trouble hiring a qualified attorney on a
contingent fee basis, 21 7 a § 1988 fee award served no purpose. 2 18 The "private
attorney general" theory has its origin long before Congress passed § 1988, but
it expresses the same underlying motives, and some courts have analyzed §
1988 claims using it. 2 19 Courts using this approach generally emphasize the
importance of the underlying civil right and the extent to which the litigation
211
212

Id. (emphasis supplied).
S. REP. No. 94 -1011, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912

(quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (discussing the 1964
Civil Rights Act)).
213

Boveri, supra note 208, at 1299.

214 See McNamara, supra note 208, at 321-22 (outlining the broad circumstances in

which courts have denied monetary damages, including attorney's fees).
215 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (articulating for the first time the factors that
would later be labeled the "bright-prospects" test).

216
217

See id. at 1042.
See id. at 1044 (noting that "where a plaintiff sues for damages and the prospects of

success are sufficiently bright to attract competent private counsel on a contingent fee

basis," the need for attorney's fees award might be eliminated).
218 See id. ("[T]he principal factor to be considered by the trial judge in exercising his
discretion is whether a person in the plaintiffs position would have been deterred or
inhibited from seeking to enforce civil rights without an assurance that his attorneys' fees
would be paid if he were successful."); cf. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 90 (1989)

(holding that contingent-fee agreements are not a cap on § 1988 awards).
219 See McNamara, supra note 208, at 335 & n. 119 (noting that even after the passage of
§ 1988, some courts "continue to view fees requests in terms of whether the plaintiff
benefits any class and effectuates a strong congressional policy" and citing such cases).
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benefits the general public-a lack of importance or benefit to the public could
result in the denial of fees. 220 The last test, the totality of circumstances, is
followed by many courts in differing ways, recognizing courts' broad
discretion to deny fees in appropriate cases. 22' Courts employing this theory
have denied fees because, for example, "[this] case... apparently meets all of
222
the language set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 but ...none of its spirit."
Although we do not advocate a return to these fees-limiting doctrines in §
1983 cases brought to enforce the Constitution or a civil rights statute, the
reasoning behind them still rings true in "and laws" cases. When Congress
passed § 1988, § 1983 had not yet been held to apply to statutory violations,
and there is no indication that Congress expected fees to be available in noncivil rights cases. In addition, similar to the "bright-prospects" test, it is
apparent that wireless communication service providers often have strong,
valuable claims under the TCA and do not need the added incentive of
attorney's fees to pursue them. Finally, the rights involved in "and laws"
claims often do not offer the same social benefit as the constitutional rights
involved in most § 1983 cases. Of course, holding § 1988 to be prima facie
inapplicable to certain § 1983 claims plainly flies in the face of Thiboutot, 223 so
we do advocate that the holding of Thiboutot, that fees are automatic in "and
laws" cases, either be overruled or limited to cases involving civil rights or
related concerns.
Thus, even if the "and laws" action is available to enforce the TCA's cell

siting provisions, there are persuasive reasons why courts should seriously
consider using their discretion to deny providers fees and costs in cases
brought to challenge zoning decisions. First, providers, unlike many civil
rights plaintiffs, have strong economic incentives 224 and the financial ability to
220 See id. at 335 (noting that if a plaintiff did not benefit any class that the fee award
would be inappropriate).
221 See id. at 338-43 (discussing the differences between the Fifth Circuit's and Fourth

Circuit's approaches to the totality-of-circumstances test); see also, e.g., Thorsted v.
Munro, 75 F.3d 454, 456 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court's denial of attorney's
fees based on the totality of the circumstances which it identified); Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F.2d
875, 877 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing a lower courts denial of attorney's fees under § 1988
after noting that under the circumstances of the case, to hold otherwise would undermine the
principal statutory purpose of § 1988).
222 Green v. Carbaugh, 460 F. Supp. 1193, 1194 (E.D. Va. 1978). This is hardly a new
maxim. "[W]e should remember the 'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers."' Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 448 U.S. 454, 469
(1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 469 (1975)
(quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
223 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,9 (1990) ("Since we hold that this statutory
action is properly brought under § 1983, and since § 1988 makes no exception for statutory
§ 1983 actions, § 1988 plainly applies to this suit.").
224 Although we do not have hard information about the value of individual cell sites, if
you divide industry revenue ($50 billion) by existing sites-(95,000) the average site
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vindicate their rights. Providers are not likely to forego their rights just
because attorney's fees are not available, and they are obviously not likely to
be too poor to afford attorneys. Further, at least some of the rights granted in
the TCA are clearer than many of the constitutional interests advanced by civil
rights plaintiffs, so litigating them is likely to be less risky than litigating many
civil rights claims. In addition, the rights protected under the TCA do not
enjoy the preferred status that led Congress to pass the § 1988's attorney's fees
provision: § 332(c)(7) does not protect fundamental rights that would "become
225
[a] mere hollow pronouncement" without § 1988's fee shifting provision.
Congress's fear that the cost of private enforcement of civil rights would be so
great that enforcement would cease, has no application in this context.
Another set of reasons for caution regarding attorney's fees for violations of
TCA § 332(c)(7) involves the nature of the claims and the identity of the
defendants. Claims under the TCA cell siting provisions are likely to be
claims challenging the decisions of duly authorized state and local
governmental bodies. 226 Given both the "American rule's" tradition of not
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing litigants and the lack of congressional
attention to whether providers should receive attorney's fees for wrongful
denials of cell siting permits, federal courts should hesitate before awarding
attorney's fees. The potential for substantial awards of attorney's fees may
illegitimately deter state and, especially, small local governmental units from
exercising their rightful zoning authority. Actual awards may penalize cities
and towns that, in good faith, attempted to limit cell towers in ways that
ultimately are determined to violate the TCA. 227 Although in many cases
generates approximately $526,000 annually. See Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n,
supra note I and accompanying text. Undoubtedly some sites generate much more and

others generate much less, and it is logical to assume that new sites are the least valuable,
because presumably companies would have developed the most lucrative sites first.
225 S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913.
226 State agencies and state officials in their official capacity are not "persons" subject to

suit under § 1983, so any effort to sue them under the "and laws" clause of § 1983 would
likely fail. However, state officials in their personal capacities, and local government bodies

and officials, are persons subject to suit under § 1983 and presumably could be sued for
damages and injunctive relief for violating § 332(c)(7). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV
1998).
227 The cases establish that some courts have found violations when, from all outward
appearances, zoning authorities have denied permits to construct cell towers for reasons
consistent with traditional zoning concerns, such as aesthetics, preferred allocation of areas
for various uses, and congestion. See, e.g., Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan & Zoning
Comm'n, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182 (D. Conn. 1998) (finding a TCA violation where town
denied permit to place antenna in 135 foot tall steeple on top of church, based on finding
that the "height and scale of the proposed steeple would not be in character with the
neighborhood"); Nat'l Telecomm. Advisors v. City of Chicopee, 16 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119
(D. Mass. 1998) (finding a TCA violation where town denied permit to build tower on an
industrial site where town wanted to save the site for a "true industrial use"); Sprint
Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47, 51 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding a TCA
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individual officials would be indemnified, there is a potential chilling effect on
state and local government officials if, in addition to injunctive relief for
wrongful permit denials, they might be liable for attorney's fees and
damages. 228 Although these costs are worth bearing in many civil rights
contexts, they may not be so when the rights at stake are purely economic, as
in the cell siting area. The promise of expedited judicial review of adverse
decisions, coupled with the economic incentives providers have to pursue their
claims, should be adequate to vindicate the interests protected by the TCA.
Unless any denial of a federal right under color of state law is thought of as
a civil rights issue, providers suing under § 332(c)(7) and § 1983 have no more
justification for fee awards than any other civil litigant under the "American
rule." There are many situations in which private litigants find themselves in
litigation with state and local government bodies over zoning and other
regulatory matters, and it normally takes specific legislative action to create an
entitlement or eligibility for awards of attorney's fees. There is no evidence
that Congress anticipated that TCA cell siting violations would give rise to
attorney's fees, and courts should deny them unless special circumstances
make an award appropriate.
The majority of providers have apparently not invoked § 1983 or § 1988
when they have attempted to enforce their rights under § 332(c)(7). Although
only one reported case has actually awarded attorney's fees and costs to a
wireless communication service provider, Smart SMR 11,229 others appear to
contemplate such awards. 230 The Smart SMR I court justified its award, in
violation where town denied permit to construct tower in an "already congested area").
228 The most likely targets of § 1983 damages suits to enforce the TCA and attorney's

fees motions are municipalities, because they are more likely than individuals to have assets

sufficient to satisfy judgments and do not share the states' sovereign immunity from
damages awards. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Municipal governments are liable for § 1983
damages for final decisions denying permits such as those to build communications towers.

See generally Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (recognizing that cities
are "persons" amenable to suit within the meaning of § 1983 but only for those acts
representing official policy).
Individual members of town planning and zoning
commissions and the like may enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 damages if they are

acting in a legislative capacity when deciding whether to grant a construction permit or
zoning variance. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. 391 (1979) (holding that members of regional planning agency are absolutely immune
from damages for actions taken in a legislative capacity).
229 See Smart SMR of New York, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 143, 154 (D.
Conn. 1998) (awarding attorney's fees and costs to Smart SMR as part of the remedy for a §
332(c)(7) violation); see also APT Minneapolis, Inc. v. City of Maplewood, No. Civ.972082(JRT/RLE), 1998 WL 634224, at *8(D. Minn. Aug. 12, 1998) (granting APT's request
for attorney's fees and costs under § 1988 for a violation).
230 See, e.g., AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 210 F.3d 1322 (11 th Cir.
2000), vacatedfor lack ofjurisdiction,223 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir. 2000), reinstated,250 F.3d
1307 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, No. 00-15885, 2001 WL 901250
(11 th Cir. Aug. 10, 2001), and appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 00-15885, 2001 WL
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part, on the ground that "the threat of attorneys' fees could influence zoning
authorities to ensure that their decisions comply with the Telecommunications
Act's requirements. '2 3' But the purpose of § 1988 is "not simply to penalize
litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but,
more broadly, to encourage individuals ...

to seek judicial relief .... ,"232

Courts should not simply conclude that § 1988 applies and therefore justifies
the imposition of penalties on the losing party. The Smart SMR H court's
concerns could be addressed by the inherent power of courts to award fees
"when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons"' 233 without creating an entitlement to fees in cases
brought to enforce the TCA.
III. POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE TCA AND

§ 1983

"AND LAWS" LITIGATION

In this section, we shift gears from considering the statutory issues
surrounding the construction of § 332(c)(7) and the availability of attorney's
fees under § 1988, and we direct our attention to the constitutional problems
with the cell siting provisions of the TCA and the "and laws" clause of § 1983.
In particular, the specific duties placed on state and local governments may
violate recent Supreme Court decisions limiting federal power to require local
governments to administer federal programs. Further, the "and laws" clause of
§ 1983 is subject to constitutional doubt insofar as it was passed pursuant to
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. "And laws" claims
like those enforcing the TCA have no connection whatsoever to the Fourteenth
Amendment or other constitutional rights, and thus they may run afoul of
recent pronouncements on the nature of, and limits to, Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Section 704 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act Is Unconstitutional

There is no doubt under current constitutional standards that the Commerce
Clause grants Congress the power to regulate the use of the airwaves and most
telecommunications activity because most such activity affects interstate
commerce. 234 Although we do not question the legitimacy of Congress's
1049229 (11 th Cir. Sept. 13, 2001).
231 Smart SMR 11, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 148; see also APT Minneapolis, Inc., 1998 WL at *8
("[Aln award of attorney's fees is not only clearly warranted, but necessary if there is any
hope that the Maplewood City Council will comply with the TCA in the future.").
232 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. at 402 (discussing the 1964 Civil Rights
Act).
233 See Alyeska Pipeline Servs. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)
(quoting F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974)).
234 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
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interest in ensuring that local zoning laws do not interfere with the
development of wireless communication services, we do question whether
Congress's chosen regulatory method runs afoul of recent cases interpreting
23 5
the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment.
Rather than empower a federal agency to administer federal wireless
facilities siting standards, Congress has commanded state and local zoning
authorities to apply federal standards and act according to federally prescribed
procedures. In particular, in addition to those factors that state and local
authorities consider under state and local law, Congress requires that zoning
authorities neither "unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally
equivalent services" 236 nor act in a way that has "the effect of prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services. 2 37 Congress has also prescribed
procedures that state and local zoning authorities must employ--decisions
within a "reasonable period of time" 238 and written decisions based upon a
written record 239-and it has commanded state courts with jurisdiction over
Tribes.");.see 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (establishing the FCC to implement the 1934
Telecommunications Act).
235 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."). It is an odd feature of recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that the
analysis begins with an acknowledgment that Congress is regulating within its Commerce
Clause power. The language of the Tenth Amendment would seem not to apply to
congressional action that is concededly within an enumerated power. Nonetheless, as we
shall see, recent case law has created a category of congressional action that is within the
Commerce Power but, nonetheless illogically, violates the Tenth Amendment's reservation
of non-delegated powers to the states.
236 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) (Supp. IV 1998).
237 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
The prohibition against considering the
environmental effects of radio emissions does not seem to present as serious a Tenth
Amendment problem as the other substantive provisions of § 332(c)(7)(B). See 47 U.S.C. §
332(c)(7)(B)(v). This aspect of the TCA is similar to many instances of federal preemption
of state law in that it represents a federal determination that something is safe or socially
useful and prohibits state law to the contrary. Zoning authorities are not compelled to apply
a federal health or environmental standard, rather they are merely prohibited from taking
certain factors into account, much as state agencies that regulate power plant construction
are prohibited from denying a permit to build a nuclear plant based on safety concerns.
Thus, we think that this provision would survive Tenth Amendment scrutiny.
238

A State or local government or instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for
authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a
reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed with such government or
instrumentality, taking into account the nature and scope of such request.
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
239 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) ("Any decision by a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless
service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a
written record.").
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TCA claims to hear and decide cases on an "expedited basis. '2 40 These
requirements run afoul of recently recognized Tenth Amendment limitations
on Congress's power to enlist state and local government agencies in the
241
enforcement of federal law.
The recent trend toward limiting federal power over states began with the
Supreme Court's decision in New York v. United States,242 in which the Court
considered New York State's challenge to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act.243 One of the Act's provisions, the "take-title" provision,
compelled states either to adopt certain regulations related to low-level
radioactive waste or simply to take title to the waste, thus becoming
responsible for any damage it caused as a result of inadequate storage. 244 The
Court acknowledged that "[it]s jurisprudence in this area has traveled an
246
unsteady path," 245 but it avoided any attempt to clarify its prior holdings.
The issue in New York was "the circumstances [if any] under which
Congress may use the States as implements of regulation. ' '247 The Court found
that, in implementing the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Congress
had given the states "a choice between two unconstitutionally coercive

240

Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to Act by a State or local
government or any instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph

may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court
of competent jurisdiction. The court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited
basis.

47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(v).
241 The TCA's "substantial evidence" requirement may also create a commandeering
problem. Although the statute explicitly provides that zoning authorities must base their
decisions on "substantial evidence," it is implicit that, on judicial review, state courts would
be required to apply the substantial evidence test. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(iii). This may
amount to commandeering state courts because state law may provide for a different
standard of judicial review. However, there are reasons to permit the federal government to
commandeer state courts which do not apply to federal commandeering of other state and
local governmental units. See infra notes 280-284 and accompanying text.
242 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
243 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021j (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
244 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 174-75 (describing the take-title

provision).
245 Id. at 160 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 312 U.S. 183 (1968), Nat'l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985)).
246 Id. at 160-61 (citing Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., and Garcia). "This litigation presents no
occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of any of these cases, as this is not a case in which
Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties." Id. at
160.
247 Id.at 16 1.
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248
regulatory techniques .... ,,
Congress could neither command the states to
regulate according to its wishes nor could it simply vest title to the waste in the
states. Perhaps the most direct statement of the principle is the following:
"While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly,
including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never
been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to
govern according to Congress' instructions. '249 Congress may regulate private
individuals directly, and such regulations can preempt state law to the contrary,
but Congress may not directly compel the states to regulate.
It is irrelevant to the analysis in New York v. United States that the
Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate in the area. As the
Court stated:
No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution
simply does not give Congress the authority to require the States to
regulate. The Constitution instead gives Congress the authority to
regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation.
Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to
legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as
250
its agents.
Legitimate questions can be raised concerning the wisdom of a doctrine that
allows Congress to preempt state authority in an area completely but does not
allow Congress to require states to cooperate in enforcing federal law. For
example, it seems like a lesser intrusion on state authority to require local
zoning authorities to administer local zoning law under federal standards than
it would be for Congress to grant the FCC the power to order localities to allow
providers to erect facilities wherever the FCC decides. Yet the former method
251
would be constitutional while the latter would not.
The Court's normative basis for its recent Tenth Amendment decisions may
rationalize this apparent disparity. The Court's primary normative justification
252
may be characterized as requiring transparency in political accountability.

248Id. at 176 ("[A]n instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing

alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and... a direct order to regulate,
standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress .....
249 Id. at 162.
250 Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
251The Court has acknowledged, in both New York and Printz, that arguments like these
may make the Court's commandeering doctrine appear formalistic. "The result may appear
'formalistic' in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such measures are
typically the product of the era's perceived necessity." Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898,
933 (1997) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 187). In both cases, the Court
responded that the Constitution is often concerned with questions of form, and that the form
of our government is what preserves the separation of powers. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933,
New York, 505 U.S. at 187.
252 Justice O'Connor first argued for this in her dissent in Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982).

But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
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The prohibition against requiring states to administer federal law prevents the
federal government from avoiding responsibility for federal law by making it
appear that state or local officials are responsible for regulatory action. If the
federal government preempts an area and sets up its own bureaucracy,
confusion is less likely to occur over which arm of government is responsible
for regulatory action.
The majority on the Court apparently views
transparency in political accountability as important enough to fuel its recent
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. 253 Although we are not sure that the Court
has provided an adequate normative basis for the doctrine, we are confident
that the TCA raises serious questions under these principles.
The Court reaffirmed and extended the reasoning in New York five years
later in Printz v. United States,254 in which the Court held unconstitutional the
Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act's 255 requirement that local law
enforcement officials make reasonable efforts to conduct background checks
256
on certain prospective handgun purchasers within five business days.
Justice Scalia summarized the Court's position as follows:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress
cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's officers
directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and
"Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 822 (1998) (arguing that accountability
concerns do not provide an adequate basis for the Court's recent Tenth Amendment
decisions).
253 The Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence also addresses a part of the problem of
unfunded mandates under which the federal government imposes obligations on state
government without paying the costs of compliance. Not every unfunded mandate violates
the Tenth Amendment principles that prohibit requiring state and local government to
administer federal law, but whenever the federal government requires state and local
government to administer federal law without compensating them for doing so, such action
amounts to an unfunded mandate. For example, Congress did not provide funds for zoning
authorities to assemble written records or to produce their decisions in writing. This helps
to explain why Tenth Amendment principles are not violated if Congress gives state a
choice between administering federal law or declining to accept federal funds. This can
even be questioned because the federal funding process is highly coercive. In substance, the
federal government imposes taxes, or in periods of deficits borrows money, beyond what is
needed to fund federal government programs, and then offers some federal money to state
and local governments on the condition that they obey federal standards when using the
federal money. The magnitude of federal taxation and federal borrowing makes it more
difficult for state and local governments to raise money on their own, and state and local
governments are effectively coerced into accepting federal money for their programs with
federal strings attached.
254 521 U.S. 898 (1997).

255 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (amending the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18

U.S.C. §§ 921-930).
256 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 903.
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the States to address particular problems, nor command the States'
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a
257
federal regulatory program.
More recently, the Court addressed the scope of the Tenth Amendment
limitations on the Commerce power in Reno v. Condon,258 which involved a
challenge to a provision of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which
prohibits states-and private individuals-from selling driver's license
information, such as address and phone number data, without the driver's
informed consent. 259 South Carolina challenged the law, basing its argument
on Printz. A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
upheld the law primarily on the ground that Congress was regulating the states
directly, not dictating how the states were to govern their own citizens. 260 The
federal law prohibiting the sale of driver's license information did not require
the states to enforce federal law, rather it held the state's own activities to
federal standards. 261 The fact that state employees would need to take steps to
comply with the Act's provisions was not enough to violate the principles laid
down in Printz, because those employees were not spending time applying
262
federal law to third parties.
Section 332(c)(7) of the TCA is unconstitutional under this recent
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Notwithstanding §
332(c)(7)'s title, "Preservation of local zoning authority," the statute in fact
restricts local zoning authority and requires local zoning bodies to regulate
third parties-wireless communication service providers-according to federal
standards and procedures. 263 Section 332(c)(7) restricts not only the method in
which local zoning authorities operate but also the substantive grounds they
may consider when deciding whether to grant or deny a zoning permit for a
cellular telephone tower.264 Section 332(c)(7) does not directly regulate
private citizens, nor does it regulate state or local government activities.

259

Id. at 935.
528 U.S. 141 (2000).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).

260

See Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) ("[The Act] does not require the South

257
258

Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials
to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.").
261 See id. at 150-51 (comparing the Driver's Privacy Protection Act to a federal statute
that prohibited states from issuing unregistered bonds, which the court upheld in South
Carolinav. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)).
262 See id.
263 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (Supp. IV 1998) ("Except as provided in this paragraph,
nothing in this chapter shall limit or effect the authority of a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and
modification of personal wireless service facilities."); see also 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)
(prescribing the federal standards that state and local governments must follow in making
decisions on the placement, construction, and modifications of wireless service facilities).
264 See discussion supra accompanying notes 95-98.
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Rather, it regulates state and local government treatment of private citizens.
Thus, § 332(c)(7) is not saved by Condon's approval of laws that regulate the
265
states' own activities.
It is irrelevant to Tenth Amendment jurisprudence that Congress may have
power under the Commerce Clause to take over the area of cell siting, for
example by giving the FCC the power to decide cell siting issues and to
promulgate orders allowing the building of wireless service facilities.
Congress has not passed such legislation, and legislation seizing local control
over zoning would be very controversial. It would be inappropriate for the
federal courts to uphold § 332(c)(7) on the ground that more intrusive
legislation would present an easier constitutional case, because there is little
reason to believe that the more intrusive legislation would ever actually
become law.
Recently, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
the constitutionality of § 332(c)(7). 66 However, that panel failed to produce
an authoritative decision on the TCA's constitutionality. A two member
majority ruled in favor of the county board of supervisors' decision to deny a
permit to build a cellular tower. 267 One member of the majority, Judge
Niemeyer, thought that the county's decision violated the TCA but found the
TCA unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. 268 Judge Niemeyer
analyzed the TCA's cell siting provisions under the Supreme Court's recent
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, 269 and he concluded that the requirement that
permit denials be supported by substantial evidence "'commandeer[s]' the
County's legislative process and is therefore unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment. '270 The second member of the majority, Judge Widener, found
the county's decision to be in compliance with the TCA and thus did not reach
the TCA's constitutionality. 27 1 The dissenting member of the panel, Judge
King, found against the county on both grounds, i.e., that the TCA was
constitutional and had been violated. 272
Condon is in the same line as National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), under which the Court has allowed extensive regulation of states' own activities,
such as state treatment of state employees. What the Court has not allowed, under New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) is
Commerce Clause-based federal control over state regulation of third parties.
266 See Petersburg Cellular Partnership v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 699-706 (4th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
265

267

See id. at 691.

268 See id. at
269

705-06.

See id. at 696-706.

270 See id. at 705 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 175).

271 Judge Widener concluded that the county's decision was supported by substantial
evidence, so he did not reach the constitutional issue. See id. at 707.
272 Judge King found that the county's decision was not supported by substantial
evidence and that the Act was constitutional. Therefore, he alone among the panel would
have ruled against the county and held that the permit should have been issued. see id. at
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We need to be clear that not every provision of § 332(c)(7) is
unconstitutional under anti-commandeering principles.
The provision
prohibiting state and local zoning authorities from considering the
environmental effects of transmissions is a classic example of federal
preemption of state law. 273 This prohibition, in our view, raises no
commandeering issue because it does not affirmatively require state and local
authorities to act; it merely states a specific federal prohibition that is binding
on state and local officials. 274 However, in our view, the federal provisions
that cellular tower permit denials may not unreasonably discriminate among
providers of functionally equivalent services or have the effect of prohibiting
the provision of service, violate anti-commandeering Tenth Amendment
principles. 275 Although these may also appear to be classic examples of
preemption, we do not think they should be considered as such, because, in
effect, their application would transform state and local zoning authorities into
federal administrators charged with developing and applying a body of federal
zoning rules to cell siting permit applications. Unlike the environmental
effects prohibition, these additional substantive provisions are so vague that
they place local zoning authorities in substantial doubt about whether they
have the power to deny a permit. This uncertainty and the possibly broad
application of federal law have the potential to reshape completely state and
local zoning practices. This is precisely the evil that the Court has attempted
to eliminate with its anti-commandeering jurisprudence.
In addition, the normative basis underlying the anti-commandeering doctrine
supports striking down even the prohibition against considering the
environmental effects of transmissions. All of the substantive standards force
state and local zoning bodies to apply federal standards in their regulation of
third parties, obscuring the fact that permits may be granted against the wishes
of the local authorities only because federal law so requires. One can easily
imagine a disagreement among local officials and local constituents on
whether federal law requires granting a particular permit. Under the Court's
anti-commandeering principles, state and local agencies should not be required
710-11. Judge King's opinion relied on Congress's ability conditionally to preempt local
land use regulation:
Congress need not directly preempt state law whenever it wishes to regulate private
activity affecting interstate commerce. Instead, it may employ conditional preemption;
that is, Congress may seek to induce states to regulate activities affecting interstate
commerce by threatening to preempt contrary state regulation if the state itself fails to
regulate in accordance with federal instruction.
See id. at 713.
273 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (Supp. IV 1998).
274 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(198 1)(upholding the surface mining act as consistent with National League of Cities, as the
statute "regulates only 'individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of
the government of the Nation and the State in which they reside."' Hodel, 452 U.S. at 293,
quoting National League of Cities v.Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976)).

275 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), (II).
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to resolve such disputes and then apply their own interpretations of federal law
in administering state and local law. If the federal government wants to grant
cellular providers an entitlement to build facilities, it should administer the
entitlement itself and not force state and local zoning authorities to do the
dirty work. Achieving the Supreme Court's goal of transparency in political
accountability would require the federal government to administer a permit
system, and anti-commandeering principles should be understood broadly to
prohibit the federal government from requiring state and local administrators to
apply federal standards when they are regulating private parties. 27 6 We should
also note that even if the substantive elements are constitutional, the
requirements that petitions be heard within a reasonable period of time 277 and
that denials be in writing based on substantial evidence on a written record, 278
present pure cases of commandeering and thus remain subject to anticommandeering attack.
279
The provision granting a federal cause of action to attack permit denials
may be within Congress's powers, provided the permit denial is not
challenged on the ground that the state failed to comply with one of the
unconstitutional provisions of the TCA. Even if the provision allowing parties
aggrieved by the denial of a permit to construct a wireless facility to
"commence an action in any court of competent jurisdiction" 280 means that
state courts must hear such actions, we do not believe that the provision
violates the Supreme Court's anti-commandeering rules. It is well-established
that state courts must hear federal claims that are similar to other claims within
their jurisdiction, 281 and at least three related sets of reasons have been given
for holding that this is permissible despite commandeering concerns.
The first set of reasons for allowing Congress to require state courts to hear
federal claims rests on the historical role of the state courts in enforcing federal
law. The Constitution does not create lower federal courts, and it appears that
the expectation was that state courts would hear federal claims, subject to
Congress's power to assign particular federal claims to lower federal courts
that it might create. 28 2 It was not until 1875 that the lower federal courts were
granted general federal question jurisdiction, and even then an amount in
276 Roderick Hills has argued that political accountability is always difficult to determine
in federal-state cooperative regulation, regardless of whether "commandeering" is present.
See Hills, supra note 252, at 826.
277 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
278 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
279 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
280 Id.

281See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389 (1947) (holding that state courts have adequate
and appropriate jurisdiction under established state law to adjudicate a claim brought under
a federal statute and as such are not permitted to refuse to enforce such a claim).
282 See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § I, cl.I ("The judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time establish.")
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controversy requirement meant that some federal claims were cognizable only
283
in state courts.
The second set of reasons depends on the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution. 284 The argument is that the Supremacy Clause was directed most
strongly at state courts, with the understanding that state courts would ensure
that federal law was enforced throughout the United States.
The third set of reasons holds that states are not truly obligated to recognize
federal claims in their courts unless they choose to open their courts to claims
that are similar to federal claims. Once the state courts are open to a particular
type of claim, the supremacy of federal law requires that the state courts not
discriminate against federal claims, but if the state courts are not open to that
type of claim, the obligation to hear federal claims does not arise. The
reference in the TCA to courts of "competent jurisdiction 285 presumably
would not require a state court, that was without jurisdiction, to hear the
federal claims arising under the TCA. For example, if a state decided to stop
hearing tort claims in its courts, then perhaps it would not be obligated to hear
§ 1983 claims in its courts because the Supreme Court has "repeatedly noted
''286
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability.
One possible response to our entire attack on the constitutionality of §
332(c)(7) is that there is no commandeering because state and local
governments could avoid all the duties imposed by the statute simply by
getting out of the business of zoning. It is only because state and local
governments have decided to impose zoning and other land use restrictions that
federal law creates obligations. The federal government is not coercing state
and local governments to act. Rather, state and local governments have
decided to act, and the federal government is merely insisting that state and
local governments conform to valid federal law. This is preemption, not
commandeering. There is no coercion of state and local authorities; if they
merely decide to do nothing, they will incur no obligation to enforce or
administer federal law. They could simply allow property owners to build
whatever facilities they want, and federal law would not enter the picture.
It may be that the Supreme Court would agree with the above analysis and
hold that the TCA does not commandeer in the way that the federal statutes at
issue in New York 287 and Printz288 did. The Court stressed in New York that
283 See Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (creating federal court and federal

question jurisdiction subject to an amount in controversy requirement of $500).

284 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme law of the land.").
285 See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (Supp. IV 1998).
286 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994) (noting that § 1983 "creates a species
of tort liability in favor of persons who are deprived of 'rights, privileges, or immunities
secured' to them by the Constitution" and citing Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986)).
287 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
288 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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there was no way for the State of New York to avoid its obligations under the
federal law challenged in that case. 289 However, we do not believe that the fact
that states could stop regulating zoning means that there is no coercion present
in § 332(c)(7). This argument, in fact, could have saved the Brady Act
provisions struck down in Printz, because the Brady Act's obligations
regarding background checks for gun purchasers were directed at the "chief
law enforcement officer" of the area in which the purchase was being made. 290
State and local governments could have avoided their federal obligations by
getting out of the business of law enforcement: without a chief law
enforcement officer, no state or local employee would have been
commandeered. Although this argument is correct in theory, in practice it is no
more realistic to expect state and local governments to abandon zoning than it
is to expect them to abandon law enforcement.
Further uncertainty regarding our conclusion that the TCA's cell siting
provisions violate the Tenth Amendment arises from the fact that the Court
upheld a somewhat similar federal statute in Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission v._Mississippi29 1 ("FERC"). That case involved the federal Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), 292 which was enacted by
Congress in response to the energy crisis of the 1970s and required state utility
commissions to "consider" adopting federal standards for regulating utility
rates. Federal law did not require that any of the standards actually be adopted
by the state agencies, but it did prescribe procedures that the state agencies
were required to follow when considering whether to adopt federal
standards. 293 Further, PURPA granted the Secretary of Energy, and in some
cases affected utility companies and consumers, the right to intervene in state
proceedings regarding the federal standards, and any person participating in the
state proceedings was granted the right to seek judicial review of the state
294
agency's decision in state court.

289 See New York, 505

U.S. at 177 (explaining that the provisions of the Low-Level

Radioactive Waste Policy Act at issue require a state to follow the direction of Congress,
regardless of the path the state chooses, and as such, exceeds the scope of congressional
power).
290 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 898.

291 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
452 U.S. 264 (1991).

See also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,

We think that Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n is also

no longer good law for basically the same reasons that we find FERC to be superseded by
the analysis in New York and Printz. See infra notes 299-305 and accompanying text. We
confine our discussion here to the FERC case.
292 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
293The procedures specified included notice and comment rulemaking by the state
agency on whether to adopt the federal standards. The federal statute also required the state
agency to provide a written statement of reasons if it decided not to adopt federal standards
and states were required to report to the Secretary of Energy once per year for ten years on
their consideration of the federal standards. 16 U.S.C. § 2626(a).
294 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(b), 2621(c)(2), 2631(a), 2633(c)(1) (1994); 15 U.S.C. §§ 3203(a),
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The State of Mississippi filed suit in federal court challenging PURPA as
exceeding Congress's commerce power and as violating the Tenth
Amendment's protections of state sovereignty. The Court upheld PURPA in
its entirety. The Court easily dismissed the Commerce Clause challenge,
holding that even intrastate power transmission has sufficient interstate effects
to support federal regulation. 295 The Court found the Tenth Amendment
challenge somewhat more difficult, but nonetheless upheld PURPA on two
related grounds. First, the Court noted that Congress has the power, under the
Commerce Clause, to preempt completely state regulation of electricity rates,
and it viewed Congress's instructions that states consider-under federal
procedures-whether applying federal standards would be a lesser intrusion
on state prerogatives.2 96 Second, the Court found that Congress had not
commandeered state agencies to enforce PURPA because states could avoid
federal regulation altogether by getting out of the business of regulating
electricity. 297 Given this choice, the Court reasoned that requiring state utility
commissions to consider adopting federal standards did not violate state
sovereignty that was protected under the Tenth Amendment.
The Court's reasons for upholding PURPA apply with substantial force to
the TCA's regulation of state and local zoning with regard to wireless
communications facilities. First, the Commerce Clause justifications for
federal regulation are quite strong, with cell towers possibly constituting the
298
paradigm case of an interstate network subject to federal regulation.
Second, it seems pretty clear that Congress could completely preempt state
regulation of zoning with regard to cellular towers. Third, state and local
governments arguably are not commandeered because they could avoid federal
regulation by simply abandoning regulation of zoning. Thus, if the Court
simply were to apply its reasons for upholding PURPA to the TCA's cell siting
provisions, it appears likely that the TCA would be upheld against a Tenth
Amendment challenge.
In our view, FERC v. Mississippi is no longer good law, 299 and under
3203(c), 3205 (1994).
295 See FERC, 456 U.S. at 755-56 (stating that congressional findings relating to federal
regulation of interstate power meet the necessary rational basis standard).
296 See id. at 764-65 (noting that the Commerce Clause allows for total congressional

preemption of private utility regulation. Under PURPA Congress chose not to preempt state
regulation but chose instead to allow continued state regulation, provided that the states
consider suggested federal standards).
297 See id. at 766-67.

Thanks to Randy Barnett for making this point.
299 In Printz, the Court distinguished FERC on the ground that in FERC states were only
298

required to "consider" federal standards, but in Printz, state officials were required to act

under federal standards. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926-28 (1997). We do
not find this distinction persuasive since the state utility agencies in FERC were certainly
required, by federal law, to take significant procedural actions in their regulation of electric
rates and services.
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current Tenth Amendment standards, the TCA's cell siting provisions would
be held unconstitutional.
The Court viewed FERC as a case of first
impression, and it rejected Justice O'Connor's Tenth Amendment
commandeering analysis, which she offered for the first time in her dissent in
300
that case, and which a majority later accepted in New York v. United States.
None of the three reasons for upholding PURPA is, in our view, sufficient to
uphold the TCA. First, in its more recent Tenth Amendment cases, the Court
has stated that the strength of the federal interest is irrelevant to whether there
is a possible Tenth Amendment violation. 30 Second, the fact that Congress
could preempt state regulation of cell tower siting has also been held to be
irrelevant to current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.302
Because the
normative basis of current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is the Court's
focus on transparency of political accountability, the form of federal regulation
is more important than the degree to which it displaces state regulatory
authority. Complete preemption is normatively preferable to commandeering.
Third, the fact that the state could avoid commandeering by abandoning
regulation of cell siting presents a possible limitation on the reach of the
Court's current Tenth Amendment doctrine, but it is unclear whether this is so.
The Court has not mentioned this factor in its last three Tenth Amendment
decisions,30 3 except to point out in New York v. United States that states had
no way to avoid their obligations under federal law: They were required either
to regulate under federal standards or to take title to nuclear waste. 3°4 It seems
unrealistic to say that a state or local government has a choice under the TCA
because it can avoid federal regulation by abandoning an area that the local
30 5
political community found important enough to subject to regulation.
Further, as we point out above in Printz v. United States, the Brady Act's
background checking requirements could have been avoided if state and local
governments decided to abandon law enforcement, obviously an exceedingly
unlikely decision. Few if any local governments will give up zoning to avoid
being commandeered into applying federal standards to cell tower siting
disputes. Further, it seems inconsistent to hold that it is irrelevant that the
federal government can preempt an area completely but then hold that the state
or local government has the choice to abandon regulation, which in effect is
the same as complete federal preemption.
In sum, it seems to us that the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is

100

505 U.S. 144 (1992).
3' See Printz, 521 U.S. at 931-32; New York, 505 U.S. at 177-78.
302 See New York, 505 U.S. at 160, 166.

313 See generally Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
3o See New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76.
305 We view this choice as different in kind from the frequent choice state and local
governments have regarding whether to accept federal conditions attached to the receipt of
federal funding. There, the coercion, while present, is much less than the choice to give up

regulating in an area entirely in order to avoid federal standards.
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heading toward a strong prohibition against federal commandeering of state
and local agencies to enforce federal law either against or in favor of private
parties. The choice to abandon an area of regulation is not likely to be viewed
as enough to eliminate the coercive element of commandeering. The doctrine
may appear to place form over substance because the degree of federal
regulation is irrelevant to whether the commandeering principle is violated, but
the anti-commandeering principle appears not to take into account the degree
of the burden, only its form.
We wish to emphasize that we are somewhat uncomfortable with the
Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.
It seems somewhat out of
proportion if relatively minor instances of commandeering are per se
unconstitutional while extensive, expensive, and direct regulation of state
30 6
functions is left intact, virtually subject only to the political process,
especially when the commandeering occurs in a field that Congress could, if it
chose, entirely preempt. What the Court condemns as commandeering actually
might be preferable to complete preemption, in that it creates a system of
cooperative federalism within which those elements of federal concern are
covered by federal law while state law governs most issues. In fact, we are
still somewhat puzzled over the apparent inconsistency between the language
of the Tenth Amendment and the Court's view that the Tenth Amendment
applies even when Congress acts within its enumerated powers. Because the
Tenth Amendment, on its face, reserves to the states or the people, only "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution," the most
natural reading of the Tenth Amendment is that it applies only when Congress
30 7
acts outside its enumerated powers.

Even if we are correct that under current legal principles the TCA's cell
siting provisions are unconstitutional, it is of course not certain that the Court
would so hold. Results in Supreme Court cases are often surprising. Perhaps
the Court's anti-commandeering jurisprudence will be refined so that the
TCA's cell siting provisions would be upheld because states agencies are
subject only to minor federal control, and then only if they continue to regulate
in an area where a genuine choice over whether to regulate arguably exists.
Further, the transparency of political accountability could be maintained some
other way, for example if state and local officials could inform the public that
they are under federal compulsion, or if state and local authorities felt free to
deny permits and granted them only when courts enforcing the TCA ordered
them to do so. Although this still puts the state or local authority through the
expense and inconvenience of litigation, it would likely be apparent to
constituents that permits were granted under compulsion and that state and
local officials were not responsible. Attorney's fees under sections 1983 and
1988 would make this process significantly more expensive for the zoning
306 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (arguing

that "the political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the state will not be
promulgated").
307 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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authorities and would increase the coercion they felt in deciding whether to
deny a permit, thereby risking litigation. Thus, even if the TCA's cell siting
provisions are constitutional, the values underlying the anti-commandeering
doctrine counsel against awarding attorney's fees to telecommunications
companies that successfully challenge permit denials.
B. ConstitutionalProblems with the "and Laws" Clause
In addition to the constitutional difficulties presented by the TCA's cell
siting provisions, there are reasons to question the constitutionality of § 1983's
"and laws" clause. Despite twenty years of case law construing and applying
the clause, 30 8 there is no indication that its constitutionality has been
challenged or considered. However, recent jurisprudence on the reach of
Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 30 9 indicates that the
"and laws" clause may lack a sufficient basis in Congress's constitutional
powers.
The short statement of the argument that the "and laws" clause is
unconstitutional, is that § 1983 was passed pursuant to Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and most "and laws" claims have no
connection whatsoever to the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the history of
the "and laws" clause makes it difficult to be certain about the power under
which it was passed. Section 1983 was passed in 1871 as part of a statute
designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 310 Originally, the statute
provided a cause of action against persons violating constitutional rights under
color of state law. 31' Later, in the revision of 1874, the "and laws" clause was
308

Dating from Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (stating that the "and laws"

clause should not be limited to "some subset of laws").
309 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
310 See 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (1873); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973)
(noting that § 1983 is rooted in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, whose primary purpose was
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
311 See Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, § I (providing a cause of action for the
violation of rights "secured by the Constitution" without mentioning "laws").
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That any person who, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject. or cause to be
subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States,
shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the
contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the
several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights
of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts,
under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six,
entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to
furnish the means of their vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the United
States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.
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added, 31 2 and ultimately the Supreme Court decided, despite strong evidence
that no substantive changes were intended in the revision process, 31 3 that this
clause created a cause of action whenever a state or local official violated a
federal statute. 314 This opened an enormous amount of state activity to § 1983
litigation, because many federally funded programs are administered by state
agencies under federal standards. 31 5 Under the "and laws" clause, a state's or
local official's violation of federal standards in administering a joint statefederal program could lead to § 1983 damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's
316
fees against the official or a municipal government.
There is no question that § 1983 was passed originally under Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The open issue is whether the
revision process had any effect on this. There is no indication in statutes or
legislative history that Congress invoked additional powers during the revision
process. In fact, it appears that Congress viewed the Statutes at Large as the
primary source of statutory authority. In authorizing the publication of the
Revised Statutes in 1874, Congress stated that the Revised Statutes should
contain "marginal notes referring to the statutes from which each section was
compiled and repealed by said revision" and that "the printed volumes shall be
legal evidence of the laws and treaties therein contained, in all the courts of the
United States, and of the several States and Territories. ' 317 It appears that the
revision was a codification of existing statutes so that the power under which
the original statute passed would be the power against which the provision in
the Revised Statutes would be measured in determining whether Congress
acted within its constitutionally delegated powers. Thus, because the "and
laws" clause was incorporated into the predecessor of § 1983 during the
revision process, the safest assumption is that it was passed pursuant to
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
Assuming that the "and laws" clause, like the remainder of § 1983, was
passed pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power, the question
17 Stat. 13 § 1 (1873).
312 See Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1878) (adding the "and laws" clause); see also Thiboutot, 448
U.S. at 4.
313 See 2 CONG. REC. 827 (1874).
314 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,5 (1980).

315 See id. at 3 (offering Social Security as an example of a federally funded program
administered by state agencies).
316 The state itself, however, cannot be sued under § 1983. See U.S. CONST. amend. Xl
("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign state."); Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (holding that liability runs primarily against individual officials
and municipalities who can be sued under the municipal policy standards).. See also Jack
M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.

627,628 (1999) (describing the origins of municipal liability jurisprudence).
317Act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat. 333 (1879).
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becomes whether the clause is a legitimate exercise of that power. We argue
that Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend
to creating causes of action that have no connection to violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Many, if not most, potential "and laws" claims have
no connection to the Fourteenth Amendment. If a Fourteenth Amendment
violation were present, the claim could be brought under § 1983 without the
"and laws" clause. Not every violation of federal law by a state official
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. When the "and laws" clause of § 1983
provides the only basis for the federal claim, there is no Fourteenth
Amendment violation.
Congress lacks power under the Fourteenth Amendment to create a cause of
action against state and local officials who violate federal statutes passed
pursuant to some other power, such as the Commerce Power. Recent Supreme
Court decisions support our position that Congress lacks power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to pass remedial statutes that do not address violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment or at least interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In these decisions, the Court has held that the power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment may be invoked only when a substantial portion of
the conduct targeted violates that amendment, and the remedy prescribed must
be in proportion to the scope of the unconstitutional conduct addressed. 31 8 The
"and laws" clause flunks these requirements with flying colors since it
prescribes a broad-based remedy in cases where there is no constitutional
violation nor even any relationship to the interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although it is arguable that religious liberty and freedom from
discrimination based on age or handicap are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no connection between Fourteenth Amendment interests
and the rights created by the TCA's cell siting provisions. Therefore, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not grant Congress the power to pass § 1983's
"and laws" clause.
This is actually an easier case for unconstitutionality than the cases
involving Fourteenth Amendment legislation against discrimination or other
conduct that might not actually violate the Fourteenth Amendment. These
cases raise none of the difficult issues that arise when Congress attempts to
legislate the substance of a constitutional right in situations that may be
318 See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001)

(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars Americans with Disabilities Act suits by state
employees against states because Congress had not identified a pattern of discrimination
violating the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress did not impose a remedy that was
congruent and proportional to the targeted violation); Kimel v. Bd, of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000) (holding the Eleventh Amendment bars Age Discrimination in Employment Act suits
by state employees against states despite a clear congressional statement to abrogate such
immunity, because such an abrogation exceeds Congress's power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is beyond Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power).
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analogous to constitutional violations but where no constitutional rights are
actually violated. Rather, the "and laws" cases are cases in which Congress,
acting pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, granted a
remedy for violations of other statutes that were passed pursuant to unrelated
powers such as the Commerce Power or Spending Power. The closest
precedent is the Supreme Court's recent decision holding that the power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant Congress the power to make
states liable to private parties for patent infringement. 19 There, as here,
Congress was motivated by statutory violations "that do not necessarily violate
the Constitution. '320 As the Court has explained, the power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment is limited to remedying constitutional violations: "We
thus held that for Congress to invoke § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment], it
must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing
such conduct.

'32 1

The likely response to our argument is that it does not matter whether the
"and laws" clause itself was passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The power under which the statute being enforced in the "and laws" action was
passed would normally support litigation against state and local officials to
redress violations. To use the TCA as an example, the Commerce Power
underlying the TCA as a whole provides ample support for damages,
injunctions and attorney's fees against state and local officials-and
municipalities-who violate its cell siting provisions. It should not matter that
Congress, in passing § 1983, relied upon its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, because courts normally look for any constitutional basis for
3 22
statutes, even if Congress explicitly cited one that did not support the statute.
We recognize the force of these arguments and realize that it is unlikely that
the "and laws" clause will be struck down. However, although there are
instances in which the Court has looked beyond the power identified by
Congress as the basis of a statute, we have not found an explicit statement by
the Court that this is proper. Further, in at least one case, the Court has stated
that when Congress specifies a power, the omission of reference to another
"precludes consideration" of it.323 Despite these doubts, it may be that as long
319 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999) [hereinafter Florida Prepaid].
320 Id. at 646.
321 Id. at 639.
322 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10 (1883) (rejecting the Commerce

Clause as the basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1875, even though Congress relied only upon
Fourteenth Amendment).
323 The Court stated:

There is no suggestion in the language of the statute itself, or in the House or Senate
Reports of the bill which became the statute, that Congress had in mind the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since Congress was so explicit about
invoking its authority under Article I and its authority to prevent a State from depriving
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as the statute being enforced is supported by any of Congress's enumerated
powers, so too is the application of the "and laws" clause to litigation under the
statute. However, there are reasons to be cautious about adopting this line of
reasoning, both particularly regarding § 1983 and generally.
With regard to § 1983, the civil rights context of that statute, and the
repeated claims that the revision process was not meant to make substantive
changes in the law, cast considerable doubt on the correctness of the Supreme
Court's decision not to limit the reach of the "and laws" clause to equal rights
laws. 3 24 Although the Members of Congress were told there was a change in
the text of the § 1983, they were assured that "it may operate differently" only
"in a very few cases." 325 There is no indication that anyone knew that the
revision was creating an entirely new class of § 1983 actions that would
impose attorney's fees on local governments and local government officials
who violated federal statutory law. More fundamentally, when Congress has
acted pursuant to other powers, such as the Commerce Power or the Spending
Power, the "and laws" remedy is most likely to exist when Congress chose not
to include a § 1983-like remedy in the statute itself, 326 indicating that Congress
has not chosen to pass § 1983-like remedies under its other powers. Had
anyone proposed a statute under the Commerce and Spending Powers, making
state officials liable for damages, injunctions, and attorney's fees for all
violations of federal statutes, it seems to us very unlikely that it would have
passed either in 1871 or more recently.
More generally, Congress's identification of a power could serve as an
interpretive principle, limiting the reach of the statute to instances within the
particular power identified by Congress as the basis for the statute. When
Congress explicitly relies upon a particular power when passing a statute, it
may be that the same statute would not have passed had Congress been forced
to rely upon a different power.3 27 Members of Congress have their own views
on the reach of each of Congress's enumerated powers.Suppose that some
Members of Congress thought that the Fourteenth Amendment supports the
a person of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, we
think this omission precludes consideration of the Just Compensation Clause as a basis
for the Patent Remedy Act.
FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 642 n.7.
324 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 8 n.5 (1980).
325 2 CONG. REC. 828 (1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
326 If Congress had put a § 1983-like remedy into the statute itself, the "and laws" action
might not be available because the particular statutory remedy would indicate congressional
intent not to allow the additional § 1983 remedy. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying
text.

327 When Congress names a particular power, it could mean that Congress wants the
statute only if that power supports it. This is, however not the only plausible reason why
Congress names a particular power in support of some statutes. Perhaps it is more plausible
that Congress realizes that there are doubts about whether any power supports the statute,
and Congress wants to express the view that the named power provides support.
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"and laws" clause but that the Commerce Clause does not. Had the "and laws"
clause been proposed as an exercise of the Commerce Power, those Members
might have voted against it, under their independent duty to obey the
Constitution. In short, there is always the chance that Congress would never
have passed a statute had it known that the statute could only be supported by a
328
power different from the one it explicitly relied upon.
CONCLUSION

History, precedent and concepts of federalism demonstrate that providers
should not be able to recover attorney's fees under § 1988(b) through a § 1983
action to enforce § 332(c)(7). Section 332(c)(7) is unconstitutional because it
violates the Tenth Amendment federalism principles elaborated in recent
Supreme Court decisions. Even if § 332(c)(7) is constitutional, most of its
provisions are too indefinite to create enforceable rights, and its own remedial
provisions should preclude recourse to § 1983. Further, claims by wireless
communication service providers are not the type of claims that Congress had
in mind when it created an entitlement to attorney's fees for successful § 1983
plaintiffs. Thus, even if courts allow such § 1983 claims to go forward, they
should use their statutory discretion under § 1988(b) to deny fees and costs.
Providers are able to protect their interests without seeking fees and costs
against local governments and government officials who pursue legitimate
zoning interests.

328

When Congress passes a statute without naming a power, it is likely that Congress

means to pass the statute under any available power.

